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Equal employment opportunity (EEO) law has played a poor role in
incentivizing effective diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and harassment
prevention programming. In litigation and investigation, too many judges
and regulators credit employers for maintaining policies and programs
rather than requiring employers to embrace efforts that work. Likewise, many
employers and consultants fail to consider the organizational effects created
by DEI and harassment programming. Willful ignorance prevents the
admission that some policies and programming harm those most in need of
protection.
This approach has resulted in two problems. One is a doctrinal dilemma
because important presumptions embedded in antidiscrimination law are
tethered to employer practices, many of which do not promote EEO.
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Simultaneously, society faces an organizational predicament because
employer practices are driven by unexamined myths about how to achieve
bias and harassment-free environments. Neo-institutional theory explains
how this form-over-substance approach to EEO law and practice began and
has evolved. This Article builds upon that theory by arguing that favorable
conditions exist for a shift from a cosmetic to an evidence-based approach to
legal compliance. Three developments mark the way forward: (1) a
pathbreaking Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) report;
(2) the EEOC’s call for better research on DEI and harassment prevention
program efficacy; and (3) new social science research discussing which DEI
efforts are most likely to succeed and those most likely to prompt backlash.
To facilitate evidence-based EEO compliance, this Article advocates
changes in liability standards. It also recommends the creation of a
supervised research safe harbor for employers willing to work with
researchers and regulators to assess and continuously improve their DEI and
harassment prevention efforts. Finally, the Article urges lawyers to more
frequently employ Brandeis briefs in litigation to place social science
research directly in front of jurists. Solving the twin problems wrought by
cosmetic compliance requires taking seriously the findings of social
scientists. An evidence-based approach to DEI and harassment prevention
would assist in restoring the promise of EEO law to create healthy, diverse,
and bias-free U.S. workplaces.
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We need a workplace that creates a sense of belonging for everyone.
⎯Google Diversity Annual Report 20201
Corporate practices thought to quell discrimination have frequently activated it.
⎯Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage, and Alexandra Kalev2

INTRODUCTION
President Joe Biden famously promised to assemble a cabinet that
“looks like America,” a pledge especially important in light of the scarcity of
minorities and women on his predecessor’s team.3 Given the ubiquity of
diversity rhetoric and programming in the corporate world, this goal was in
line with the ethos of many firms.4 President Biden succeeded in building a

1. GOOGLE DIVERSITY ANNUAL REPORT 2020, at 6, https://diversity.google/annual-report
[https://perma.cc/ZM84-HAKY].
2. Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage & Alexandra Kalev, Rage Against the Iron Cage: The Varied
Effects of Bureaucratic Personnel Reforms on Diversity, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 1014, 1036 (2015).
3. Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Fulfilling a Promise: A Cabinet that ‘Looks Like America’, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/us/biden-cabinet-diversity-gender-race.html
[https://perma.cc/5UPB-DVUD]. One day after President Biden’s inauguration, his cabinet nominees
were 52 percent people of color and 48 percent female. In comparison, President Donald Trump’s cabinet
was 17 percent people of color and 21 percent female. Id.
4. See Brent K. Nakamura & Lauren B. Edelman, Baake at 40: How Diversity Matters in the
Employment Context, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2627, 2639 (2019) (“Virtually every organization now has
a public commitment to diversity and inclusion as well as policies that purport to prohibit discrimination
and harassment and complaint procedures that allow employees to complain about instances of
discrimination or harassment.”).
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remarkably diverse cabinet, including several appointment firsts.5 Indeed,
while there are groups that likely feel their interests are not represented,6
Biden’s selections appear congruent with the professed commitments of
many U.S. employers.7 Unlike many employers, however, the President
made good on his promises. Biden’s laudable and consequential efforts to
place a diverse group of people in powerful executive branch positions
represent a symbolic and substantive turning of the page after a period in
which equal employment opportunity (EEO) suffered significant setbacks.
This historical episode was marked by two features: the Trump
administration’s well-documented and widely known hostility to the cause of
workplace civil rights,8 and the EEO losses and impacts precipitated by the
COVID-19 pandemic.

5. President Biden’s cabinet includes the first: female Secretary of the Treasury (Janet Yellen);
Black Secretary of Defense (Lloyd Austin); Native American in the cabinet (Deb Haaland, Secretary of
the Interior); and Latinx/immigrant to serve as Secretary of Homeland Security (Alejandro Mayorkas).
Lindsay Chervinsky & Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, The Changing Faces of Cabinet Diversity: George
Washington
through
Joe
Biden,
Brookings
(Apr.
13,
2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/04/13/the-changing-faces-of-cabinet-diversity-georgewashington-through-joe-biden/ [https://perma.cc/DD4A-LRL2]. President Biden’s cabinet also includes
the first Latinx Secretary of Health and Human Services (Xavier Becerra) and first openly gay cabinet
secretary (Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg). See Biden Progress Report, INCLUSIVE AMERICA
(Apr. 23, 2021), https://inclusiveamerica.org/bidenprogress/ [https://perma.cc/6FKM-5PLU].
6. White evangelical Christians, from whose membership the Trump administration frequently
drew for high posts, were noticeably absent from the list of Biden cabinet nominees. See Yonat Shimron,
A Look at Joe Biden’s Religiously and Ethnically Diverse Cabinet Nominees, America Mag. (Jan. 20,
2021),
https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2021/01/20/president-joe-biden-cabinetcatholics-239767 [https://perma.cc/LF95-2W5B] (“One group not represented [among Biden’s cabinet
nominees]? White evangelicals, the group most loyal to President Donald Trump. Trump not only won an
overwhelming majority of white evangelical support, both in 2016 and 2020, he also appointed many to
his Cabinet, well beyond their demographic representation.”).
7. See Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2639.
8. Referencing the Trump administration’s civil rights agenda underscores the importance of
President Biden’s appointments. Assembling a diverse cabinet signals “broader initiatives . . . inextricably
tied to policy” and an administration’s “spirit . . . and values . . . and who [the administration is] interested
in connecting with in the American public.” See Rita Prasad, Biden Cabinet: Does this Diverse Team
Better Reflect America?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada55080344 [https://perma.cc/L9WD-4V92] (quoting Ohio State University political science and gender
studies Professor Wendy Smooth). This Article will not dwell further on the “anti-antidiscrimination
agenda” of the Trump administration. See David B. Oppenheimer, Donald Trump, Ronald Reagan, and
Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Law: What Happens when Civil Rights Agencies Are
Sabotaged?, 170 REVUE FRANÇAIS D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 345, 356 (2019) (noting that President
Trump has an “anti-anti-discrimination” agenda). For further information see Bryce Covert, The Trump
Administration
Gutted
the
EEOC,
THE
NATION
(Jan.
28,
2021)
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/janet-dhillon-eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/H5S9-AT3A], (detailing
the deleterious changes instituted by Trump’s chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Janet Dhillon); Ben Penn & Paige Smith, Trump Agencies Aim to Reshape Workplace Anti-bias
Enforcement,
DAILY
LAB.
REP.
(BLOOMBERG
LAW)
(Oct.
26,
2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/trump-agencies-aim-to-reshape-workplace-anti-biasenforcement [https://perma.cc/XMG7-SZSC] (describing the Trump administration’s efforts to “restrict[]
the Labor Department’s ability to refer complaints from individual workers to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and giving the Justice Department heightened oversight”); Fabiola Cineas,
Critical Race Theory, and Trump’s War on It, Explained, VOX (Sept. 24, 2020),
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Regarding the pandemic, Black and Latinx people, in addition to facing
health disparities, are overrepresented among essential workers, and hence
have borne elevated risks of serious illness and death. 9 Likewise, the popular
press extensively covered the disproportionate job losses suffered by women
following the shuttering of large swaths of the economy, including the
significant rise in unemployment among women of color. 10 There was similar
coverage about working women shouldering a disproportionate burden of
supervising children as schooling went online—a phenomenon that has
hampered and even ended careers.11 Experts predict that these aspects of the
pandemic will have a long lasting impact on EEO.12
Fewer may be aware, however, that workplace harassment and
discrimination proliferated during the global health emergency.13
https://www.vox.com/2020/9/24/21451220/critical-race-theory-diversity-training-trump
[https://perma.cc/82D4-28TT], (discussing Trump’s executive order banning federal contractors from
conducting racial sensitivity training); Sadie Gurman & Jess Bravin, Justice Department Seeks to Limit
Scope of Landmark LGBT Rights Decision, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-seeks-to-curtail-workplace-protections-for-gaytransgender-people-11611091426 [https://perma.cc/G5JG-56VV] (discussing a last ditch effort to curtail
the reach of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) that the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity).
9. Professor Catherine Powell noted that the pandemic did “not affect us all equally” and that “the
viruses of sexism and racism” interacted with COVID-19 and amplified its harms disparately. Catherine
Powell, Color of Covid and Gender of Covid: Essential Workers, Not Disposable People, 33 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 3–4 (2021). In the two-tier American labor market, essential workers, among whom Black
and Latinx people were overrepresented, shouldered an elevated risk of contracting COVID-19. Id. at 10.
Yet Powell notes that racial and ethnic minorities were ironically also “more likely to suffer from job loss”
caused by the pandemic. Id. at 11. Additionally, factors such as diminished access to healthcare and dense
residential conditions contribute to the greater risk from COVID-19 shouldered by racial and ethnic
minorities. See Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Minority Groups, CTR. FOR D ISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Apr.
19,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/K78T-Y6XU].
10. See Linda C. McClain & Naomi Cahn, Gendered Complications of Covid-19: Towards a
Feminist Recovery Plan, 22 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2021).
11. See generally Jessica Fink, Sidelined Again: How the Government Abandoned Working Women
Amidst a Global Pandemic, 2022 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
12. See Claire Cain Miller, Shorter Hours, No Promotions: How the Pandemic Stalled Some
Parents’
Careers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(THE
UPSHOT)
(July
21,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/upshot/coronavirus-careers.html [https://perma.cc/YBX7-F5S8]
(noting that working shorter hours due to care obligations during the pandemic “could have long-term
effects on [parents’] careers,” especially those of mothers).
13. One survey revealed that more than half of mothers working as food servers reported an increase
in “unwanted sexualized comments from customers” during the pandemic. See ONE FAIR WAGE & UC
BERKELEY FOOD LABOR RESEARCH CTR., IT’S A WAGE SHORTAGE, NOT A WORKER SHORTAGE: WHY
RESTAURANT WORKERS, PARTICULARLY MOTHERS, ARE LEAVING THE INDUSTRY, AND WHAT WOULD
MAKE
THEM
STAY
3
(May
2021),
https://onefairwage.site/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/OFW_WageShortage_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/494U-PTXH]. A recent study of
the technology industry found the shift to remote work during the pandemic worsened harassment of and
hostility towards “Asian, Black Indigenous, and Latinx [workers], especially women and non-binary
people, and transgender and non-binary people generally, and people over 50.” YANG HONG, MCKENSIE
MACK, ELLEN PAO & CAROLINE SINDERS, REMOTE WORK SINCE COVID-19 IS EXACERBATING HARM 6
(Mar. 2021),
https://projectinclude.org/assets/pdf/Project-Include-Harassment-Report-0321-F3.pdf
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Underscoring the pandemic’s exacerbation of workplace inequality, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) held a hearing on
April 28, 2021 on the COVID-19 “civil rights crisis” experienced by many
workers.14 One expert testified about an “onslaught of anti-Asian hate”
directed at “Asian Americans who are wrongly blamed for . . . COVID-19.”15
Testimony also revealed that pregnant workers were denied workplace
accommodations and that there was widespread caregiving discrimination.16
Witnesses additionally discussed workers disabled with long-term COVID
symptoms in need of accommodations,17 and significant age discrimination
affecting older workers displaced from their jobs due to the pandemic.18 The
experts’ statements at the EEOC hearing did not cover the difficulties faced
by all vulnerable groups. For example, the pandemic exacerbated the
vulnerabilities of LGBTQ workers, who were more likely than the general
population to be employed in jobs with high exposure to COVID-19 or work
in industries that shuttered because of the pandemic.19
These ills highlight the need to create a workplace hospitable to all, or
at least most, Americans and make plain the wisdom of President Biden’s
commitment to make his team reflect the country. Creating healthy and
inclusive organizational climates requires effective diversity, equity, and

[https://perma.cc/VP52-4XMH]. A global survey of five-thousand women in ten countries during the
pandemic, found, inter alia, 52 percent of respondents reported experiencing “some form of harassment
or non-inclusive behavior at work in the past year.” MICHELE PARMELEE & EMMA CODD, DELOITTE,
WOMEN@WORK:
A
GLOBAL
OUTLOOK
13
(May
2021),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-women-at-workglobal-outlook-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TBW-SHGF].
14. See Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Examines Connections
Between COVID -19 and Civil Rights (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-examinesconnections-between-covid-19-and-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/UH5Q-CNFT].
15. Testimony of John C. Yang, President and Executive Director, Asian Americans Advancing
Justice, EEOC Examines Connections Between COVID-19 and Civil Rights (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-april-28-2021-workplace-civil-rights-implications-covid-19pandemic/yang [https://perma.cc/F5DS-S2E8].
16. Testimony of Fatima Goss Graves, President and CEO, National Women’s Law Center, EEOC
Examines Connections Between COVID-19 and Civil Rights (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-april-28-2021-workplace-civil-rights-implications-covid-19pandemic/graves [https://perma.cc/V56H-D4M9].
17. Testimony of Damon Hewitt, Acting President and Executive Director/Executive Vice
President, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, EEOC Examines Connections Between
COVID-19 and Civil Rights, (Apr. 28, 2021) https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-april-28-2021workplace-civil-rights-implications-covid-19-pandemic/hewitt [https://perma.cc/6XP9-GC37].
18. Testimony of Laurie McCann, Senior Attorney, AARP, EEOC Examines Connections Between
COVID-19 and Civil Rights, (Apr. 28, 2021) https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/meeting-april-28-2021workplace-civil-rights-implications-covid-19-pandemic/mccann [https://perma.cc/2WB8-44DE].
19. See Craig Konnoth, Supporting LGBTQ Communities in the COVID-19 Pandemic, in COVID19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER, MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE 204–09
(Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicolas P. Terry eds.,
2021), https://www.publichealthlawwatch.org/covid19-policy-playbook [https://perma.cc/EEH9-62E3].
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inclusion (DEI)20 and harassment prevention efforts. Antidiscrimination law,
however, has played a poor role in incentivizing DEI and harassment
prevention programming that works. As explained below, in litigation and
investigation, too many judges and regulators credit employers for
maintaining DEI and harassment policies and programs rather than requiring
employers to embrace efforts that deliver measurable improvements.21 Many
legislators, consultants, and employers fail to assess the effects of mandated
or voluntary DEI and harassment programming.22 This willful ignorance
prevents us from admitting that some policies and programming harm those
we most want to assist.23
How has such a situation come about? Sociologist Lauren Edelman’s
theory of legal endogeneity posited, and her research confirmed, that the
terms of EEO law compliance were created by the entities subject to
regulation rather than by government authorities.24 Decades of sociological
research by Edelman and other neo-institutional organizational scholars has
revealed that, in response to the passage of federal antidiscrimination law,
firms’ compliance experts recommended EEO policies and programs that
20. While different organizations may embrace different notions of diversity, equity, and inclusion,
the University of Michigan’s discussion of the terms is instructive. The University of Michigan is known
for its effective implementation of the national ADVANCE program, which promotes gender diversity in
science and engineering. See generally Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace
Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006). Additionally, the university’s
affirmative action efforts in admissions are known for having drawn the scrutiny of the Supreme Court in
twin cases in 2003. See Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2632. The university defines its
commitment to DEI as “key to individual flourishing, educational excellence and the advancement of
knowledge.”
University
of
Michigan,
Defining
Diversity,
Equity
and
Inclusion,
https://diversity.umich.edu/about/defining-dei/ [https://perma.cc/37XX-AXXN]. Diversity is referenced
by way of personal characteristics, including “race and ethnicity, gender and gender identity, sexual
orientation, socioeconomic status, language, culture, national origin, religious commitments, age,
(dis)ability status and political perspective.” Id. Equity refers to maintaining a culture that challenges
“bias, harassment, and discrimination” in order to secure “equal opportunity for all persons.” Id. Inclusion
refers to efforts to ensure “differences are welcomed, different perspectives are respectfully heard and
where every individual feels a sense of belonging.” Id.
21. See discussion infra Parts I.B & II.A.
22. Employers resist careful examination of their policies and programs for fear of creating evidence
that might be used against them in litigation. See discussion infra Part II.B.
23. The culture war surrounding DEI provides additional impetus for a long overdue change of
course. Examples of the culture war surrounding DEI instruction include President Trump’s Executive
Order banning the use of federal funds for diversity training, President Biden’s rescinding of that order on
his first day in office, and the efforts of conservative states to pass laws prohibiting the teaching of critical
race theory. See generally Barbara Sprunt, The Brewing Political Battle Over Critical Race Theory, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (June 29, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/02/1001055828/the-brewing-political-battleover-critical-race-theory [https://perma.cc/H9NU-ZYTY]; Jennifer Steinhauer, As Military Addresses
Diversity, Republicans See Culture War Target, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/us/politics/military-diversity.html.
[https://perma.cc/W7KKUHGW]; Valerie Strauss, The Culture War Over Critical Race Theory Looks Like the One Waged 50
Years
Ago
Over
Sex
Education,
WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/07/25/critical-race-theory-sex-education-culture-wars/
[https://perma.cc/CKD9-NCH8].
24. See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL
RIGHTS 12–14, 39 (2016) [hereinafter WORKING LAW].
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appeared rational and have since become widespread.25 Included among these
policies and programs are: “affirmative action offices or affirmative action
officer positions, diversity training programs, antiharassment policies,
grievance procedures, equal opportunity statements, and the like.”26 These
so-called “symbolic legal structures”27 did not focus on EEO outcomes and
measures. Instead, many firms administered and interpreted them in ways
that preserved managerial flexibility and the status quo.28 Over time, courts
began to look at firms’ compliance efforts as factors in determining liability
under antidiscrimination law without carefully assessing program or policy
efficacy.29 This undiscerning acceptance of symbolic legal structures created
endogenous law; the firms subject to the law set the legal terms of
compliance.30
This form-over-substance approach to compliance has resulted in two
problems. First, we face a doctrinal dilemma because, as will be expanded
upon below, important presumptions embedded in antidiscrimination law are
tethered to employer practices, many of which do not promote EEO. 31
Second, we confront an organizational predicament because employer
practices are driven by unexamined myths about how to achieve bias and
harassment-free environments.32 These presumptions and myths—for
example, that diversity training changes employee behavior or that sexual
harassment grievance procedures will decrease the incidence of
harassment—reify cosmetic compliance and hinder the transformative
potential of EEO law.
Even so, this Article demonstrates that favorable conditions exist for a
shift from a cosmetic to an evidence-based approach to legal compliance. To
facilitate that shift, I advocate not only a change in liability standards, 33 but
also the creation of a research safe harbor for innovative employers willing
to work with researchers and regulators to assess and continuously improve
their DEI and harassment prevention efforts.34 I also recommend that, as a
matter of litigation strategy, lawyers make more frequent use of Brandeis
25.

See discussion infra Part I.B.
EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 101.
27. Id. Edelman defined a “legal structure” as “[a]ny [employer] policy or practice designed to
implement a law or legal principle or that is created in response to law or by an officer with compliance
responsibilities, or is a statement that pertains to law . . . .” Id. She described “symbolic” as evoking “a
notion of legality and compliance, usually because the structure resembles a form . . . that already enjoys
legitimacy and connotes legality.” Id. While a symbolic legal structure is not necessarily substantively
ineffective, some policies and practices “do little or nothing to advance the status of minorities or women.”
Id. Such structures are “merely symbolic.” Id.
28. See discussion infra Part I.A.
29. See discussion infra Part I.B.
30. Id.
31. See discussion infra Part II.A.
32. See discussion infra Part I.A.
33. See discussion infra Part III.A.
34. See discussion infra Part III.B.
26.
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briefs to place social science research directly in front of jurists. 35 The way
to solve the doctrinal dilemma and the organizational predicament is to take
seriously the findings of social scientists.
To address this pressing topic, Part I draws from neo-institutional
organizational scholarship to provide historical information on employers’
organizational responses to antidiscrimination law. Part I then discusses how
corporate EEO compliance efforts, in particular DEI and anti-harassment
policies and programming, were incorporated into legal doctrine through a
process described by Edelman as legal endogeneity.36 Like the organizations
themselves, most courts have not carefully assessed the utility of symbolic
structures proffered by employers as evidence in employment discrimination
lawsuits.37 Part I also explains how in EEO cases, courts are generally loath
to interrogate employer decision-making, a reluctance evident in several
judicially created rules, presumptions, and inferences.38 These doctrines
amplify the evidentiary advantage that employers enjoy in litigation and
reward bulletproofing and discrimination laundering. 39
In Part II, I argue that our understanding about such programming has
changed, creating favorable conditions for a move to an evidence-based
approach to legal compliance. More specifically, Part II examines three
developments: (1) a pathbreaking 2016 EEOC report, which concluded that
harassment is prevalent and underreported due to fear of retaliation, and that
present forms of harassment prevention training cannot be proven effective;
(2) the EEOC’s recommendation that opportunities for research on policy
and program efficacy involving employers, researchers, and regulators
should be explored; and (3) new social science research distinguishing
between the kinds of harassment prevention and DEI efforts that are likely to
succeed and those more likely to prompt backlash.40
Part III maintains that judges’ and regulators’ form-over-substance
approach to EEO compliance is not sustainable given recent social science
research and shifting public awareness. Like recent commentators, I agree
that the employer liability standards in employment discrimination law must
35.

See discussion infra Part III.C.
See EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 12–14. I call the phenomenon spurred on by
the U.S. Supreme Court “the jurisprudence of education and prevention.” See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An
Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the New Jurisprudence of
Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7–13
(2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention].
37. See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
38. See Sandra F. Sperino, Disbelief Doctrines, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 231 (2018)
[hereinafter Sperino, Disbelief Doctrines].
39. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 964 (1999) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp,
Bulletproofing the Workplace]; TRISTIN GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 2 (2017) [hereinafter
GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING].
40. See discussion infra Part II.
36.
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change.41 There is also a role for carefully considering changes in what
employers may use as competent evidence in EEO cases. A change in liability
and evidentiary standards, however, is a necessary but insufficient corrective
to conditions we face in our post-pandemic workplace. In addition to a
change in liability standards, I recommend programming incentives for
employers who take DEI and the concept of the respectful workplace to heart.
I advocate for creating a research safe harbor for employers willing to engage
with researchers and regulators on EEO and DEI.42 Finally, in Part III, I argue
for more frequent use of Brandeis briefs in EEO suits to challenge the
mythology about how best to achieve bias-free workplaces.
Part IV then provides a short conclusion. The doctrinal law of equal
opportunity should not stand when it is based on falsehoods and wishful
thinking. This is especially true as we emerge from a period when EEO gains
were under political and viral attack. A fresh, evidence-based approach to
DEI and bias eradication would assist in reclaiming the EEO ground lost
during the last several years and help employers build workplaces that look
like America.
I.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO EEO LAW AND DOCTRINAL
RESPONSES TO ORGANIZATIONS’ COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMING

Scholars from many disciplines have explored why EEO law has proven
to be a less transformative force than its strongest supporters hoped.43 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) outlaws discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.44 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) offers protection from age bias for those
forty-years-old and older.45 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) prohibits disability discrimination. 46 In 1975, the Supreme Court
described Title VII’s primary goal as “prophylactic.”47 According to the
Court, the law was a stimulus for employer self-evaluation, a process that
41. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, The Sexual Harassment Loophole, 78 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 155, 195–96 (2021) (recommending strict vicarious liability for employers in cases involving
supervisor and co-worker hostile environment harassment); see GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING,
supra note 39, at 151 (recommending, in cases of individual discrimination, a system of vicarious liability
holding employers strictly liable).
42. See discussion infra Part III.B.
43. Indeed, many years ago, I suggested that those who teach Employment Discrimination Law
embrace a multidisciplinary approach by incorporating readings from economics, psychology, sociology,
as well as critical race and feminist legal theory. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Contextualizing the Debate:
How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship Can Inform the Teaching of Employment Discrimination
Law, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 366, 393 (1994) (“By contextualizing the debate, we can help students gain an
appreciation for the complexity of the problem of employment discrimination, and the law’s approach to
it.”).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (2018).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2018).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2018).
47. Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
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would identify and eliminate policies of “dubious legality.”48 A few years
later, the Court declared that the “‘primary objective’ of Title VII is to bring
employment discrimination to an end.”49 Despite EEO law’s prohibitions,
however, a number of measures, including labor force participation, wage
gaps, representation in management, and occupational segregation, indicate
that employment discrimination is far from vanquished.50
Neo-institutional organizational theory is helpful in explaining why
antidiscrimination law has failed to remedy continuing racial, gender, and
other disparities in the labor market. Focusing on “the process through which
common systems of meaning, values and norms develop among . . .
organizations,”51 the picture painted by neo-institutional research is one of
regulation by the regulated through processes that are subtle, taken for
granted, and sweeping in their impact. Extensive research by neoinstitutionalist scholars over the last thirty-five years has revealed how
employers reacted to the passage of the EEO statutes beginning in the 1960s.
Employers’ embrace of symbolic legal structures—for example, adopting
EEO policies and grievance procedures, introducing harassment and
diversity training, and opening affirmative action (AA) offices—shaped the
definition of legal compliance.52 Such scholarship also illuminates how legal
authorities increasingly deferred to symbolic structures as evidence of nondiscrimination irrespective of the substantive effects of those structures.53
This form-over-substance approach to compliance restricts EEO law’s
capacity to end employment discrimination. A neo-institutionalist
description of how these changes transpired appears in Parts I.A and I.B
below.
A.

Organizational Symbolic Compliance or Mythic Compliance?

Neo-institutionalist scholars note that the civil rights and social
movements of the 1950s and 1960s ushered in a revolution in personnel and

48.

Id. at 417–18.
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982).
50. See EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 6–10. See generally SUSAN BISOM-RAPP &
MALCOLM SARGEANT, LIFETIME DISADVANTAGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE GENDERED WORKFORCE
(2016) (describing how factors such as stereotyping, intersectional discrimination, caregiving
responsibility, pay inequality, glass ceilings, occupational segregation, part-time work, and pension
schemes disadvantage women over the course of their working lives and lead to a greater incidence of
poverty for women in retirement).
51. Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply––That Isn’t the
Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of Compliance, in E XPLAINING COMPLIANCE:
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103, 104 (Edward Elgar ed., 2011) [hereinafter Edelman & Talesh,
To Comply or Not to Comply].
52. See discussion infra Parts I.A & I.B.
53. See discussion infra Part I.B.
49.
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human resources policies and practices.54 The Equal Pay Act of 196355 was
the first piece of EEO legislation. It was closely followed by Title VII, which
passed the following year. Most civil rights legislation is ambiguous; the law
prohibits discrimination on various grounds, but does not detail any particular
set of steps employers must take to be legally compliant.56 Employers
responded to the uncertainty in the changing legal environment by creating
structures—policies and programs—that communicated their support for the
new social norms demanded by the civil rights and women’s movements and
new EEO legislation.57 Among the structures created were grievance
procedures,58 EEO and AA offices,59 formal promotion mechanisms,60 antiharassment policies,61 and employee and manger training programs.62
According to leading neo-institutionalist Lauren Edelman, for the first
twenty-five years of Title VII, compliance experts, particularly HR
managers, promoted the creation and diffusion of compliance structures.
These compliance structures are what neo-institutionalists call symbolic
structures.63 They signaled the employer’s attention to EEO, but did “not
guarantee the substantive achievement of civil rights.”64 The actions of
compliance professionals were responsive to the “compliance dilemma”
faced by employers.65 On one hand, new EEO legislation, initial government
pressure during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
54. See Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Are Diversity Programs Merely Ceremonial? EvidenceFree Institutionalization, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 808, 810
(Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Thomas B. Lawrence, & Renate E. Meyer eds., 2017) [hereinafter
Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization]. See generally FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY (2009).
55. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
206(d) (2018)).
56. Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson, Symbols & Substance in Organizational Response
to Civil Rights Law, 17 RES. IN SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 107, 108 (1999).
57. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 54, at 810–11.
58. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion
of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal
Environments and Organizational Governance].
59. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation
of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic
Structures].
60. See Frank Dobbin, John R. Sutton, John W. Meyer & Richard Scott, Equal Opportunity Law
and the Construction of Internal Labor Markets, 99 AM. J. SOC. 396 (1993).
61. See Lauren B. Edelman & Jessica Cabrera, Sex-Based Harassment and Symbolic Compliance,
16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 373 (2020); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Promise and Peril
of Sexual Harassment Programs, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12255 (2019) [hereinafter Dobbin &
Kalev, Promise and Peril].
62. Id.
63. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 100. It is possible for a policy or program to be
symbolic and produce substantive EEO gains. Id. at 101. The substantive effectiveness of symbolic
structures functions on a continuum. Id. at 102. Some may be substantively effective, others neutral in
EEO impact, and still others may harm those they ostensibly were designed to help.
64. Id. at 100.
65. Id. at 102–06.
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lawsuits, and social movements created normative pressure on employers to
bring organizations in line with changing expectations.66 Countering that
pressure, however, was some managers’ and trade unionists’ resistance to
change. The former were concerned that hiring minorities and women ran
counter to meritocracy, while the latter saw tension between EEO mandates
and the concepts of seniority and negotiated work rules.67
Policies and programs that operated symbolically and with minimal
organizational disruption proved an attractive solution. Implementation of
EEO policies and non-union grievance procedures conveyed employers’
commitment to non-discrimination and due process while preserving
managerial prerogatives and flexibility. 68 These symbolic policies and
programs spread broadly across U.S. organizations in the decades after the
passage of the first modern civil rights statutes.69 HR professionals, AA and
diversity managers, and in-house counsel argued in favor of such structures
because they offered forms of litigation and liability prevention.70 EEO
policies and programs eventually acquired a veneer of rationality71 and wide
acceptance.72
While the spread of symbolic EEO structures was wide, the efficacy of
the adopted policies and programs went unquestioned by those advocating
their embrace.73 Over time, however, and as will be explored in more detail
in Part II below, researchers determined that many of the actions taken by
organizations are ineffective, if not counterproductive.74 As noted by one
group of scholars:
[O]rganizations adopt antidiscrimination policies, but decouple their formal
policies from their informal practice. They create special EEO compliance
offices and affirmative action managers, but give those offices and managers
no real authority to change discriminatory organizational behavior. They

66.

Id.
Id.
68. Id. at 107–08.
69. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Rachel Kahn Best & Lauren B. Edelman, When “Best Practices”
Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Cases, 40 L. & SOC. INQ. 843, 846 (2015).
70. Edelman & Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply, supra note 51, at 108.
71. Id. As Edelman and Talesh noted, “Neo-institutionalists argue that rationality is socially
constructed by non-market factors (such as widely accepted norms and patterns of behavior) that come to
be taken for granted and institutionalized through organizational fields.” Id. at 104.
72. See Krieger, et al., supra note 69, at 846; Anna Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights
Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC. REV. 83 (2005); John
R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms,
1955 to 1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794 (1996).
73. See Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing
the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Active and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 590 (2006)
(“Whereas there has been a great deal of research on the sources of inequality, there has been little on the
efficacy of different programs for countering it. At best, ‘best practices’ are best guesses. We know a lot
about the disease of workplace inequality, but not much about the cure.”).
74. Krieger et al., supra note 69, at 846.
67.
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institute performance evaluation procedures and progressive discipline
policies, but fail to discern when managers use these policies to cover up
discrimination rather than to prevent it. . . . [M]any of the most common
structures, such as diversity evaluations, diversity training, and minority
networking programs, do little to improve the status of women and minorities
and may even harm minority groups.75

That EEO policies and practices were widely embraced by
organizations,76 management and employee-side lawyers,77 government
regulators,78 and courts79 is certain. Neo-institutionalists, however, debate the
motives behind the advocacy for these structures.
Most neo-institutionalists focus on the prevalence of symbolic EEO
structures, implicitly suggesting that employers’ compliance efforts are
driven by ceremonial shows of fidelity to law rather than a desire for
substantive change.80 Some legal scholars have described neo-institutionalist
research as skeptical of the aims of compliance efforts.81 Lauren Edelman
prudently noted that “[s]ymbolic structures may be merely symbolic, may be
both symbolic and substantive, or may fall somewhere in between merely
symbolic and substantive.”82 Even so, when legal authorities such as courts,
legislatures, or administrative agencies “infer legality from the mere presence
75. Id. at 846–47. Citations were removed from the quote. The following are the citations that were
removed: on decoupling formal antidiscrimination policies from informal practices, see Karl E. Weick,
Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1–19 (1976); Edelman, Legal
Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 59. On organizations failing to give affirmative action
officers and compliance managers authority to address discriminatory behaviors, see CHRISTOPHER D.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); Edelman,
Legal Environments and Organizational Governance, supra note 58. On instituting formal performance
evaluation procedures and discipline policies but failing to discern where managers cover up
discrimination, see Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 39.; On common DEI
structures doing little to improve the status of women and minorities, see Kalev et al., supra note 73, at
590.
76. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 39, (discussing views of
defense and plaintiff-side lawyers); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final
Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3–75 (2003)
(noting that defense attorneys in harassment cases reference compliance structures in their arguments
before judges).
78. See Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1586 (2014) (noting in a study
of the EEOC’s systemic litigation and remedial efforts that the remedies pursued mirror those long
advocated by HR professionals).
79. See discussion infra Part I.B1.
80. Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 808–09. Dobbin and
Kalev cite the following scholars for this proposition: John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); Edelman, Legal
Environments and Organizational Governance, supra note 58; Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic
Structures, supra note 59.
81. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 229, 244 (2018) (describing the skeptical stance taken by some sociologists to harassment complaint
procedures and harassment prevention policies).
82. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 32.

256

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 43:2

of symbolic structures”83 a cosmetic approach to EEO is advanced that
rewards effective, ineffective, and harmful efforts alike and “undermines
legal ideals.”84
Recently, neo-institutional scholars Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev
set their views apart from those of most neo-institutionalists. They
characterized the proponents of EEO structures as civil rights crusaders and
innovators who sought to vanquish discrimination.85 Among the individuals
who helped broadly disseminate common EEO practices were women and
minority corporate leaders, human resources professionals, and “crusading
regulators and liberal litigators.”86 Neither the EEO champions, nor the
executives who sought to retain managerial prerogatives, knew whether the
efforts would succeed.87 Rather, these actors were motivated by myths, such
as the belief that “diversity training reduces bias, and promotes workforce
diversity.”88 Such corporate myths are resistant to evidence to the contrary,
which explains the persistence of ineffective or counterproductive EEO
policies and practices.89
Dobbin and Kalev encouraged neo-institutionalists to study the effects
of EEO compliance structures. By providing data on efficacy, this research
might advance a form of diversity management that is evidence-based.90 Parts
II and III below will flesh out and build on their insights by arguing that the
time is ripe not only for a change in compliance structures but also a change
in how doctrinal law treats them. Before that, however, one must consider
Lauren Edelman’s theory of legal endogeneity, and how EEO policies and
practices inspired the creation of a jurisprudence of education and prevention.
B.

Legal Endogeneity and the Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention

Lauren Edelman’s theory of legal endogeneity posits and demonstrates
how standards for legal compliance can be constructed not by state
authorities but by those subject to legal regulation. Regarding EEO law, the
process began with compliance professionals recommending the creation of
symbolic structures: EEO policies, programs, and procedures that generally
did not focus on substantive outcome measures.91 Once created, when legal
rules appeared to conflict with “business norms and values,” the structures
were interpreted and administered in a way that preserved “traditional

83.

Id. at 39.
Id.
85. Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 811.
86. Id. at 809, 812.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 809.
89. Id. (“The myth that diversity training reduces bias . . . remains strong despite hundreds of studies
finding that bias is resistant to training.”).
90. Id. at 823.
91. See EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 123.
84.
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management prerogatives.”92 Over time, the structures signaled fealty to
antidiscrimination law while preserving the ability of organizations to
operate with minimal disruption. 93
Problematically, in EEO litigation, defense lawyers began to use
symbolic structures, such as EEO policies and programs, as evidence of nonliability.94 Through a process Edelman has referred to as “judicial deference,”
many judges eventually agreed that employer EEO policies and programs are
relevant to liability and probative on the issue of bias.95 Edelman noted that
when courts reference symbolic structures in their decisions, assuming their
relevance without interrogating efficacy, formal law becomes endogenous;
thus, the subjects of civil rights legislation establish the terms of legal
compliance.96
There are at least two areas where what I call the “jurisprudence of
education and prevention” is operative: harassment doctrine and the rules
regarding punitive damages in EEO cases.97 Additionally, judges’ general
unwillingness to second guess employer decision-making amplifies the
evidentiary advantages enjoyed by employers in EEO cases.98 These two
sides of the same coin—one a hat tip to organizations’ preventative policies
and practices, the other an admission that courts are not otherwise interested
in interrogating employer processes—reinforce a cosmetic approach to
antidiscrimination law that has crippled its transformative potential. These
matters are described below.
1. The Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention Begins with
Harassment and is Elaborated in Punitive Damages Doctrine
Harassment prevention training, policies, and grievance procedures
elegantly illustrate Edelman’s legal endogeneity theory, and my
identification of an EEO jurisprudence of education and prevention. While
the Supreme Court initially interpreted Title VII’s primary purpose as ending
employment discrimination,99 the statute does not mandate the tools for
accomplishing that aim. More specifically, Title VII does not mention
harassment policies, grievance procedures, or harassment training.
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, soon after district courts started finding
harassment actionable,100 human resources professionals began
92.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 124–25.
94. Id. at 165–66.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 39.
97. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
98. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
99. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982).
100. Abigail Saguy noted that “[t]he first feminist victory in the courts dates to 1977 . . . . The
decision in this case was informed by an early draft of [Catharine] MacKinnon’s Sexual Harassment of
Working Women, which the author herself had given to a law clerk on the case.” Abigail C. Saguy, WHAT
93.
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recommending that special harassment grievance procedures be created101
and harassment training programs initiated.102 Adding urgency to their
recommendations, compliance professionals at the time inflated the risk of
lawsuits by referencing surveys indicating that a majority of women had
experienced harassment.103 In 1980, the EEOC, the federal agency
responsible for enforcing Title VII, published its Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex,104 which set forth a recipe for creating
harassment-free environments. Stating that “[p]revention is the best tool” to
eradicate harassment, the EEOC recommended employers strongly condemn
harassment, create penalties for engaging in harassment, communicate to
employees “how to raise the issue of harassment . . . and develop methods to
sensitize all concerned.”105
Although not mentioned by those guidelines, educational programming
and employee training is a readily available means for discussing harassment,
expressing disapproval, and sensitizing the workforce.106 Indeed, as a
pathbreaking 2016 EEOC report noted, after the 1980 guidelines were issued,
many employers created training programs in hopes of preventing
harassment.107 Employers may have been influenced by erroneous claims by
personnel professionals “suggesting that the law required [harassment]
training.”108 Human resources professionals in the late 1970s and early 1980s
similarly and inaccurately claimed that harassment grievance procedures
were legally mandatory and could stave off liability.109
The Supreme Court first addressed sexual harassment as a Title VII
violation in 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.110 Although the
case is a landmark decision because it recognized that the creation of a hostile
environment based on sex is actionable under EEO law,111 dicta in the opinion
set the stage for what I call the jurisprudence of education and prevention.112
IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT: FROM

CAPITOL HILL TO THE SORBONNE 31 (2003). See generally CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
101. Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal
Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203, 1209 (2007) [hereinafter Dobbin & Kelly, How to
Stop Harassment].
102. Id. at 1212.
103. Id. at 1209.
104. 29 CFR §§ 1604.1–.11 (1980).
105. Id. at § 1604.11(f).
106. Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 17.
107. CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT
OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 44,
Section III.C. para. 1 (2016) [hereinafter EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT].
108. Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment, supra note 101, at 1212.
109. Id. at 1211.
110. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
111. Id. at 65.
112. See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 8; see also EDELMAN, WORKING
LAW, supra note 24, at 202 (noting that the dicta, while not creating an employer affirmative defense,
indicated that the Court might well do so in a future case).
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The employer in the case argued plaintiff Mechelle Vinson’s claim should be
barred because of the employer’s antidiscrimination policy and Vinson’s
failure to file a complaint about her supervisor via the employee grievance
procedure.113 Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected
that argument but provided guidance on how employers might fashion a
policy and procedure that would serve as a defense. He noted that the bank’s
“general nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassment in
particular,” and that the “grievance procedure . . . required an employee to
complain first to her supervisor, [who] in this case” Vinson had identified as
the perpetrator.114 That the bank should be insulated “from liability might be
[a] substantially stronger [contention] if its procedures were better calculated
to encourage victims of harassment to come forward.”115
As Lauren Edelman noted, the Vinson dicta was promising for
employers yet ambiguous.116 After the decision, personnel professionals
more forcefully asserted that harassment policies and grievance procedures
would provide employers with a liability shield. 117 In court, defense attorneys
stepped up their assertions that the policies and grievance procedures should
preclude employer liability.118 As an empirical matter, despite the lack the
doctrinal clarity, “[l]ower courts were increasingly deferring to these
symbolic structures.”119 Educational programming also increased; Dobbin
and Kelly dated the explosive growth in harassment training to the period
following the Vinson decision.120
Twelve years later, in 1998, an EEO jurisprudence of education and
prevention was articulated by the Supreme Court in twin harassment cases:
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 121 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.122
A year after that, the Supreme Court firmed up its new jurisprudence in an
EEO case involving punitive damages, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n.123
Together, the cases transformed jurists’ prior articulation of the primary
purpose of Title VII, which the Court had noted in 1975 was
“prophylactic.”124
113.

Vinson, 477 U.S. at 70–73.
Id. at 72–73.
115. Id. at 73.
116. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 202.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 203.
120. Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment, supra note 101, at 1216, 1220. An additional boost
to training occurred when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, among other things, made
compensatory and punitive damages available to discrimination plaintiffs. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, tit. I, §102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
121. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
122. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998).
123. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544–46 (1999).
124. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (noting that the twin goals of Title
VII are prevention and compensation).
114.
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As noted above, this earlier understanding of the objectives of EEO law
focused on, inter alia, the potential of employer liability to catalyze employer
self-evaluation.125 Concern about backpay126 and other potential remedies
would cause employers to scrutinize their policies and practices proactively,
and eliminate those that were biased without the necessity of litigation.127 The
purpose of deterrence in this view is outcome driven; the aim is to rid the
workplace of discrimination. In contrast, the new jurisprudence of education
and prevention, created by Ellerth, Faragher, and Kolstad, places the
emphasis on symbolic demonstrations of fealty to EEO law rather than
requiring bias elimination.
Ellerth and Faragher established the corporate liability standards for
harassment perpetrated by a supervisor. In quid pro quo cases, where a
tangible employment action is taken against the plaintiff, the Court held
vicarious liability is always appropriate because a superior’s ability to adjust
a subordinate’s employment status is aided by the agency relationship
between the employer and the supervisor.128 On the other hand, in hostile
environment cases, where no tangible employment action is taken, employers
may assert a two-element affirmative defense. That defense requires the
defendant to demonstrate: (1) it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,”129 and (2) that the plaintiff
unreasonably declined to avail themselves of “preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”130 While
employers are not required to adopt harassment policies and grievance
procedures, the existence of those structures is relevant to the first element.131
And though the plaintiff’s failure to use a grievance procedure is not the only
way to satisfy the second element, “a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden.”132

125.

Id.
Id.
127. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364–65 (1977) (holding that retroactive
seniority is a remedy in harmony with Title VII’s prophylactic purpose because it will encourage
employers to examine potentially illegal policies). The Court also rebuffed employer affirmative defenses,
which would allow some biased decisions to stand, on the grounds that the proffered defense would
undermine EEO law’s deterrence goals. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448–50 (1982) (rejecting,
as contrary to Title VII’s deterrent aim, an employer’s “bottom line” defense that would have allowed use
of a promotion exam that disproportionately screened out minority candidates so long as the ultimate
outcome of the multi-step promotion process was not racially discriminatory); McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publ’g, 513 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1995) (holding that it would be antithetical to EEO law’s deterrence
goal to allow after-acquired evidence of plaintiff’s misconduct to bar a discrimination suit in every case).
128. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760–62 (1998); see also Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
129. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (mirroring the elements and legal principles set forth
in the Ellerth decision).
126.
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By the late 1990s, when Ellerth and Faragher were decided, nineteen
out of twenty large employers had adopted harassment grievance
procedures.133 This is not surprising because compliance experts began
recommending harassment grievance procedures in the late 1970s and
continued to do so with increasing confidence over time.134 In line with this
advocacy, employer and business-friendly organizations filed amicus briefs
in support of the defendants in Ellerth and Faragher. Those briefs argued
that the Court should create an affirmative defense based solely on the
existence of a harassment policy and grievance procedure.135 The EEOC also
filed amicus briefs in Ellerth and Faragher supporting creation of an
affirmative defense in hostile environment cases but with a crucial
distinction: the EEOC advocated a fact-sensitive inquiry into the efficacy of
the policy and grievance procedure at issue.136
The Supreme Court ruled in harmony with employer interests. In Ellerth
and Faragher, the Court not only approved an affirmative defense for hostile
environment harassment cases where the perpetrator is a supervisor but also
refashioned the preventative aim of EEO law. Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for the majority in Ellerth, used the symbolic structures
recommended for two decades by compliance professionals as a touchstone
for the Court’s analysis. He noted that Title VII “is designed to encourage the
creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”137
Justice Kennedy’s statement was surprising, since the statute says no such
thing. In line with that conception of Title VII, however, the Court concluded
that, because these symbolic structures provide employees with incentives to
report harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive, limiting vicarious
liability through the affirmative defense advances “Title VII’s deterrent
purpose.”138
Justice David Souter, writing for the majority in Faragher, similarly
recharacterized EEO law’s prophylactic purpose. He stated that Title VII’s
main objective is “to avoid harm.”139 Rather than assert boldly, as the Court
had in earlier cases, that the “‘primary objective’ of Title VII is to bring
employment discrimination to an end,”140 the reformulated version of
deterrence focuses anemically on human resources policy creation and
“informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment.”141 Neither Justice Souter nor Justice Kennedy elaborated on the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment, supra note 101, at 1204.
See supra notes 100–120 and accompanying text.
EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 203–04.
Id. at 205–06.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
Id.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1997)).
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subject of what might make a grievance procedure effective. Indeed, so long
as the policy is distributed to employees, the implication is that it is effective.
As Edelman noted, “[B]y 1998, symbolic structures had come to be
understood not just as a means of achieving civil rights but also as the
achievement of civil rights.”142 Lower courts certainly understood this. After
creation of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, judicial deference to
harassment policies and grievance procedures increased substantially. In fact,
district court deference in the twelve years prior to the Ellerth/Faragher
decisions was identified in 24 percent of district court opinions; after the
Ellerth/Faragher decisions, deference was found in 58 percent of district
court opinions.143
In 1999, the Court added to its new jurisprudence of education and
prevention in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n.144 Kolstad established the
standards under which employers may be held liable for punitive damages in
Title VII cases. To obtain punitive damages, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the employer acted with malice or reckless indifference.145 Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, however, in a portion of the opinion joined by four other
justices, created a safe harbor from punitive damages for employers who
“engage in good faith efforts to comply” with EEO law.146 She expressly
mentioned EEO policies and programs as evidence of good faith. Just as the
law promotes effective sexual harassment policies and grievance procedures,
so too does it encourage employers “to adopt antidiscrimination policies and
to educate their personnel on Title VII’s prohibitions.” 147 Although Justice
O’Connor noted that a liability rule that reduces incentives for employers to
implement preventative measures contravenes the prophylactic purpose of
Title VII,148 the safe harbor she created ironically increases the odds that
employers will favor symbolic rather than substantive fealty to EEO law.
That the new jurisprudence of education and prevention conflates
symbolic structures with good faith is significant but unsurprising. Several
groups allied with employers filed amicus briefs in Kolstad, including the
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM),149 the Chamber of

142.

EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 208.
Id. at 185. Judicial deference is not a guarantee that an employer will win an employment
discrimination suit. Edelman explained that this is due to a myriad of factors that determine case outcome.
Nonetheless, judicial deference to symbolic structures “makes it much more likely that employers will
win the case.” Id. at 194 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, Rachel Best & Lauren Edelman., When Best
Practices Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Cases, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 843, 857–58 (2015)).
144. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
145. Id. at 534.
146. Id. at 544.
147. Id. at 545.
148. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
149. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Society for Human Resource Management, Kolstad v Am. Dental
Ass’n, 527 US. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208) [hereinafter SHRM brief].
143.
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Commerce,150 and the Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC).151 The
EEAC brief noted that large employers typically provided EEO training to
supervisors and even non-supervisory employees, and argued that any
doctrinal rule that would subject such employers to punitive damages would
be “anomalous.”152 The SHRM brief argued in favor of creating a liability
shield because it “rewards employers that take preventative measures” such
as “effective EEO training.”153 The Court agreed, but it is important to
recognize that its jurisprudence did not develop in a vacuum. Instead, the
Court’s approach was the outcome of two decades of efforts by organizations
subject to EEO law to create compliance practices that would protect them
from running afoul of the law.
Meanwhile, regulators signaled their endorsement of education and
prevention. Specifically, in 1999, the EEOC published enforcement guidance
interpreting Ellerth and Faragher, recommending employers provide all
employees with harassment training “to ensure that they understand their
rights and responsibilities.”154 The enforcement guidance also suggested that
employers “establish, disseminate, and enforce an anti-harassment policy and
complaint procedure.”155 The latter steps would help establish that an
employer took reasonable care under the affirmative defense. The work of
compliance experts had reached a valuable target: the regulators.
The Supreme Court perfected its jurisprudence of education and
prevention in 2013 in Vance v. Ball State University.156 Vance clarified that
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is a hostile environment harassment
liability shield only for supervisor conduct. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for
the majority, defined the term “supervisor” as a person with the authority to
“take tangible employment actions” such as discipline or discharge.157 Thus,
managers who lack authority to discipline and discharge are treated as the
victim’s coworkers, which places the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate
the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to
take corrective action.158 Where the perpetrator has supervisory authority,
employers avoid hostile environment harassment liability by asserting the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense and demonstrating that: (1) they were

150. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Kolstad v Am. Dental
Ass’n, 527 US. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
151. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Equal Employment Advisory Council, Kolstad v Am. Dental Ass’n,
527 US. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208).
152. Id. at 12–13.
153. SHRM brief, supra note 149, at 13.
154. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, at § V(C)(1) (1999).
155. Id. at § V(C).
156. See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 450 (2013).
157. Id. at 424, 429.
158. Id. at 427–28
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not negligent in handling harassment complaints and, (2) that the alleged
victim failed to complain or delayed in doing so.159
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter described the resulting doctrine as a
“harassment loophole,” which—regardless of whether the perpetrator is
deemed a supervisor or a coworker—exonerates employers from hostile
environment liability if they have policies against harassment and maintain a
process for receiving and investigating harassment complaints.160 The
Court’s great faith in symbolic structures is evident in the majority decision.
Attempting to rebut the dissent’s characterization of the decision as
excessively “employer-friendly,”161 the majority rattled off a list of relevant
evidence a plaintiff might proffer to establish employer liability when the
harasser is a coworker. The list included evidence of the employer failing to
“monitor the workplace, . . . [failing to] respond to complaints, . . .
[neglecting to] provide a system for registering complaints, or . . .
discourag[ing] complaints from being filed.” 162 Given the vast dispersion of
harassment policies and procedures, however, it would be a rare employee
who could muster such evidence. Many courts interpreting the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense misapply it; courts fail to scrutinize
harassment grievance procedure efficacy and absolve employers so long as
they respond to victim complaints that are filed.163 It is unlikely that courts
would take a different approach in cases of coworker harassment.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent in Vance correctly noted that the
constructive or actual notice standard for coworker harassment advantages
employers, yet she too exhibited extraordinary faith in education and
prevention:
Inevitably, the Court’s definition of supervisor will hinder efforts to stamp
out discrimination in the workplace . . . . When employers know they will be
answerable for the injuries a harassing jobsite boss inflicts, their incentive to
provide preventative instruction is heightened. If vicarious liability is
confined to supervisors formally empowered to take tangible employment
actions, however, employers will have diminished incentive to train those
who control their subordinates’ work activities and schedules . . .164

Justice Ginsburg’s earnest belief that training would vanquish
harassment is noteworthy. Harassment training has been ubiquitous in the
American workplace for decades. Despite this, the continuing high incidence
of workplace harassment demonstrates that the phenomenon is relatively

159. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 41, at 195–96; ANNA-MARIA MARSHALL,
CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 48 (2016).
160. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 41, at 189.
161. Vance, 570 U.S. at 466 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
162. Id. at 449 (majority opinion).
163. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 41, at 195–96.
164. Vance, 570 U.S. at 466 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
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impervious to training.165 Why, then did Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one of the
Supreme Court justices most committed to equality, embrace employers’
preventative practices?166 Perhaps her embrace is best understood the way
Dobbin and Kalev suggest we understand the beliefs of the crusading human
resources practitioners who helped widely disperse symbolic EEO structures
in the first place. According to Dobbin and Kalev, these practitioners’
advocacy was motivated by corporate myths such as the belief that diversity
training eliminates bias.
Clearly, Justice Ginsburg put her faith in a corporate myth. That myth,
in turn, resides in what I have called the jurisprudence of education and
prevention. Ultimately, turning away from an era of cosmetic compliance
requires nothing short of myth-busting. Before examining evidence to that
end, the next Section will situate the jurisprudence of education and
prevention—usually specifically identified with the law of harassment and
punitive damages in EEO cases—within a judicial ethos of non-intervention
in employer decision-making.
2. The Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention Nests Comfortably
with Judicial Reluctance to Second-Guess Employers
The jurisprudence of education and prevention described above is in
harmony with the non-interventionist judicial ethos of EEO law.167 Judges
are generally not comfortable evaluating employer decision-making.168 Nor,
in many cases, are judges willing to allow juries to do so. Judges frequently
keep cases from juries by granting employers’ motions for summary
judgment.169 Indeed, a study by Kent Nakamura and Lauren Edelman found
that “since 1990 . . . a significant increase in the proportion of [federal] civil
rights cases terminated through grants of employers’ motions for summary
judgments and, in the circuit courts, denials of appeals of district court grants
of summary judgment.”170 They also found increasing judicial deference to

165. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 41, at 190–92 (noting that harassment remains a
“widespread problem and that harassers often work at companies with well-developed train-and-report
systems”).
166. Jill Lepore, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Great Equalizer, NEW YORKER (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/postscript/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-court-the-great-equalizerobituary%20 [https://perma.cc/XDH2-F5J6], (“Aside from Thurgood Marshall, no single American has
so wholly advanced the cause of equality under law.”).
167. See Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2676 (noting a general “judicial reticence to review
employers’ personnel decisions”).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2652–54.
170. Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2652 (“Summary judgment is an increasingly important
and frequent manner of case disposition in employment discrimination cases.”). Summary judgment
motions determine whether there are any material questions of fact for a jury to determine. If not, the
moving party’s motion is granted. Nancy Gertner noted that employment discrimination “[p]laintiffs
rarely move for summary judgment . . . [because] [t]hey bear the burden of proving all elements of the
claim, particularly intent, and must do so based on undisputed facts.” Nancy Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122
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symbolic diversity structures without careful evaluation in EEO cases. 171
Indeed, their study determined that by 2014, judges were deferring to
diversity structures “without adequate scrutiny [of those policies and
procedures] in about 75% of district court cases and 49% of circuit court
cases.”172
A powerful example of such deference was the Supreme Court’s express
reference to Wal-Mart’s formal policy against discrimination in an expansive
class action brought on behalf of approximately 1.5 million women who were
working, or had formerly worked, for Wal-Mart. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,173 the plaintiffs alleged that a corporate culture of gender bias, and
their supervisors’ use of subjective criteria in awarding pay and deciding on
promotions, constituted disparate treatment on the basis of sex.174 Writing for
the majority, and arguing that there was no evidence that the employer
maintained a general policy of discrimination, Justice Antonin Scalia noted,
“Wal-Mart’s announced policy forbids sex discrimination . . . and . . . the
company imposes penalties for denials of equal employment opportunity.” 175
He continued with a wholly unsubstantiated theory that “left to their own
devices, most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a
corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral,
performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion.”176 As one group of
researchers observed, even though there was substantial statistical and expert
testimony to the contrary, the existence of an EEO policy helped win the case
for Wal-Mart.177
Judges who avoid evaluation of employer actions, policies, and practices
are assisted by what Sandra Sperino has called judicial disbelief doctrines,
which often are applied by jurists considering employer motions for summary
YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113–14 (2012). In contrast, employers need only demonstrate “facts in their favor
on one element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 114. Employment discrimination cases also fail frequently
due to successful employer motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In such cases, the sufficiency of the complaint is being challenged by the employer. See Joseph A. Seiner,
Plausible Harassment, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1298 (2021) (noting that the Supreme Court’s
“plausibility standard” for evaluating motions to dismiss applies to employment discrimination plaintiffs,
who “have faced difficulty in overcoming this . . . pleading bar.”).
171. Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2651. Nakamura and Edelman defined a diversity
structure as any policy or procedure that might be interpreted as evidence of fair treatment, including
“diversity or equal employment opportunity policies or complaint procedures[,] . . . progressive discipline
policies, [performance] evaluation procedures, and multi-person decision-making structures.” Id. at 2649.
172. Id. at 2651.
173. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). The Supreme Court was deciding
whether under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 there were common questions of law or fact that would
permit the plaintiffs to bring a class action. The Court held that the commonality requirement was not
satisfied. Id. at 360.
174. Id. at 342, 354.
175. Id. at 353.
176. Id. at 355.
177. Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason, Catherine R. Albiston & Virginia
Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117
AM. J. SOC. 888–89 (2011).
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judgment.178 These judicially created EEO doctrines are analytical
frameworks that support unthinking deference to employer decision-making
and undercut employees’ evidence of bias.179 For example, judges often
justify decisions favoring employers by noting that jurists do not serve as
“super-personnel departments.”180 As Sperino noted, this doctrine may block
a challenge to the employer’s stated rationale for an adverse action where:
(1) the employer lies about one of several reasons for a termination; (2)
ignores posted criteria when hiring or promoting or fails to follow its own
policies; or (3) the employee attempts to demonstrate they are the best
qualified candidate for the job.181 While such circumstantial evidence might
otherwise be a method for demonstrating illegal discrimination, some judges
use the “super personnel department justification” to exclude such proof.182
Nakamura and Edelman’s study found that by 2014, the term super
personnel department had been used in “2,855 district court opinions
involving grievance procedures, anti-harassment policies, or diversity
policies.”183 They noted that while the term is not present in most of the cases
where judicial deference to symbolic structures is evident, the doctrine
nonetheless underscores the reluctance of judges to intervene in employers’
decision-making and propensity to avoid delving deeply into the efficacy of
EEO policies and practices.184
Disbelief doctrines, like the super personnel department justification, do
not have a statutory basis,185 and violate the rules for summary judgment
which require judges to evaluate facts and “draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party,”186 who in these cases is the employee.187 The
employer-friendly, non-interventionist bent of the judiciary in EEO cases
also disregards and amplifies the evidentiary advantages held by employers.
The preventative techniques developed by compliance professionals were
developed with potential litigation in mind. Creating evidence, whether via
performance review, disciplinary documentation, formal promotion and hire
procedures, or EEO policies and grievance procedures, is an activity
routinely engaged in by employers rather than employees.188 Tristin Green
178. See Sperino, Disbelief Doctrines, supra note 38, at 31 (noting that EEO law “is riddled with
doctrines that tell courts to believe employers and not workers”).
179. See generally, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Message in a Bottle, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
53, 60 (2018) (criticizing several of the rules and noting that one “might justifiably wonder whether Title
VII was an employment discrimination law, or an employment discrimination exoneration law”).
180. See Sperino, Disbelief Doctrines, supra note 38, at 240–42. Sperino referred to the intonation
that courts do not sit as super personnel departments as a mantra. Id. at 240.
181. Id. at 241.
182. Id. at 240.
183. Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2677.
184. Id.
185. See Sperino, Disbelief Doctrines, supra note 38, at 232.
186. Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2654.
187. Id.
188. See Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 39, at 988–90.
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has termed these practices “discrimination laundering” and decried judges’
presumption of organizational innocence that is tied to it.189 Through their
deference to symbolic structures and employer decision-making, courts
signal that these systems may inoculate organizations from liability under our
EEO laws.190
In sum, organizational responses to EEO law and the judiciary’s
responses to organizations’ compliance programming produce a sharply
tilted, employer-advantaged litigation playing field which preserves the
status quo and props up the hierarchies that EEO law was designed to
dismantle.191 This system, which favors cosmetic compliance and fails to
incentivize substantive change, will not remedy the intractable problem of
workplace inequality in the U.S. workplace. Part II will detail how our
understanding of harassment prevention and diversity efforts has begun to
change and provides a basis for ending an era of cosmetic compliance.
II. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS ABOUT HARASSMENT PREVENTION AND DEI
PROGRAMMING
For years, as researchers theorized about organizations’ responses to
EEO law,192 and scholars questioned the form-over-substance direction of
judicial interpretations,193 government regulators and the courts remained
supportive and unquestioning of the symbolic structures that were supposed
to guarantee due process, fairness, and the elimination of unlawful bias.
Courts, as noted in Part I, increasingly deferred to symbolic structures over
time.194 For its part, the EEOC followed, rather than led, in developing the
shape that compliance mechanisms took. The agency advised employers to
create harassment policies and grievance procedures only after such
structures were widespread among organizations.195 Likewise, the agency
recommended judicial deference to symbolic structures “after lower courts
began deferring to them.”196
Margo Schlanger and Pauline Kim studied the EEOC’s systemic
litigation and remedial efforts from 1997 to 2006.197 They found the relief
obtained by the agency to be “routinized, bureaucratic solutions—the kinds
of ‘best practices’ endorsed by human resources professionals . . . as a
rational (if not necessarily effective) response to antidiscrimination
189.

See generally GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING, supra note 39.
Id. at 47.
191. ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS O N TRIAL: HOW
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 11 (2017).
192. See discussion supra Part I.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 170–172 and accompanying text.
195. See EDELMAN, WORKING LAW, supra note 24, at 211.
196. Id.
197. See Schlanger & Kim, supra note 78.
190.
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mandates.”198 Of the cases brought, the vast majority settled.199 The remedies
sought were not designed to transform the employers in question; rather, they
were incidental to the organizations’ core activities. Tellingly, 87 percent of
the remedial orders mandated EEO training.200 Schlanger and Kim
characterized the EEOC’s remedial efforts as managerialist in that they
mirror the compliance efforts long advocated by personnel professionals.
They warned that beyond being ineffective, such efforts might even harm the
women and minority employees they were meant to help.201
Three developments, however, set the stage for abandoning a cosmetic
approach to DEI programming and harassment prevention. The first involves
a courageous multidisciplinary examination of harassment prevention by the
EEOC. Second is the EEOC’s suggestion that opportunities be found to
engage employers in EEO program efficacy research with the participation
of social scientists and regulators. Finally, social scientists are beginning to
discover why certain DEI and harassment prevention efforts succeed and
others fail. Each development will be addressed in turn below. In Part III, this
Article suggests that a change in liability standards, creating space for
employer innovation, and continued use of social science evidence in
litigation, would help catalyze substantive EEO in the American workplace.
A.

The 2016 Report of the Co-chairs of the Select Task Force on the Study
of Harassment in the Workplace

The EEOC created a Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in
the Workplace in January 2015.202 Chaired by EEOC Commissioners Chai
Feldblum and Victoria Lipnic, the task force embarked on a searching inquiry
aimed at understanding why, decades after employer liability for harassment
was established, and despite thirty years of compliance and training efforts,
workplace harassment continues to be so prevalent.203 Assisting Feldblum
and Lipnic were sixteen task force members drawn from academia, legal
practice (representing the plaintiff and defense bar), employer and employee
advocacy groups, and labor unions.204 Importantly, the university professors
on the task force represented a number of disciplines including: law,

198.

Id. at 1566.
Id. at 1568, tbl.4.
200. Id. at 1574.
201. Id. at 1586 (the warning about backlash effects was in reference to EEO training). Years earlier,
I similarly warned about uncritical endorsement of educational and preventative efforts by courts and the
legal profession. See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 6, 29.
202. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives
for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 70 (2018) (discussing the
importance of the EEOC task force report).
203. See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107 at Preface paras. 2–3. The task force was the
brainchild of Jenny Yang, who at the time chaired the EEOC. Id. at para. 8.
204. See id. at Executive Summary para. 2.
199.
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psychology, management, and sociology.205 Over the course of a year, the
task force held numerous meetings, listened to the testimony of over thirty
witnesses, and reviewed public comments. With the spotlight on prevention,
the members sought to understand harassment from the perspective of a wide
range of experts and stakeholders.
In June 2016, the co-chairs released a lengthy report with some startling
admissions.206 Chief among them is that workplace harassment is an
enduring, and often unreported, problem.207 The co-chairs observed that
about one-third of the charges received by the EEOC in fiscal year 2015
contained an allegation of harassment.208 Yet the report also reviewed studies
on common employee reactions to harassment, finding that the “least
common response of either men or women to harassment is to take some
formal action—either to report the harassment internally or file a formal legal
complaint.”209
Acknowledging underreporting while noting receipt of almost 35,000
harassment charges in a single year210 is significant; in fact, the report
demonstrates that harassment is even more prevalent than is commonly
believed. Buttressing this point, the co-chairs explained that based on studies,
87 to 94 percent of those experiencing harassment decline to file a
complaint.211 The report also examined why so many employees are loath to
use the complaint procedures that the agency recommends employers adopt.
Here, too, the co-chairs made a noteworthy declaration: employees fear
reporting and those fears—including of retaliation—are well-founded.212
This is an astounding point for a government report to make.
Although the report did not make this point explicitly, the admission of
underreporting undercuts the rationale for the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense. More specifically, the affirmative defense does not catalyze early
reporting of incidents before harassment becomes severe or pervasive, as
Justice Kennedy opined, because many employees reasonably fear

205.

See id.
See generally id. The co-chairs emphasized that the document “is not a consensus report.” Id. at
Preface para. 9. Rather, it is a report by the task force co-chairs, which is based on all the information the
task force reviewed. Id. This aspect of their report enabled Commissioners Feldblum and Lipnic to make
bold pronouncements on harassment prevalence and the state of common harassment prevention efforts.
207. Id. at Executive Summary paras. 6–7.
208. Id. at Executive Summary para. 6. This represents approximately 28,000 charges received in
fiscal year 2015 from private sector, state, or local government employees and another 6,741 charges filed
by federal employees. Id. The report acknowledged that these numbers may be both overinclusive since
not every charge alleges actionable conduct and underinclusive due to lack of formal action. Id. at B. para.
6.
209. Id. at C. para. 5.
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
211. EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107, at C. para. 7.
212. Id. at C. para. 10–11.
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retaliation.213 Justice Kennedy’s hunch lacks an empirical basis. Thus,
considering a failure to report harassment as “normally suffic[ient] to satisfy
the employer’s burden”214 on the second element of the defense is profoundly
misguided.
Another surprising finding of the 2016 report involves harassment
training. The task force undertook an ample review of the social science
literature on anti-harassment educational programming, yet could not
determine whether standalone training “is or is not an effective tool in
preventing harassment.”215 The co-chairs noted that “it appears that training
can increase the ability of attendees to understand the type of conduct that is
considered harassment . . . [but] it is less probable that training programs, on
their own, will have a significant impact on changing employees’ attitudes,
and they may sometimes have the opposite effect.” 216 According to
Commissioner Lipnic, it was “jaw-dropping” that the task force examined
thirty years of research and failed to find that harassment training prevents
harassment.217
The co-chairs’ recommendations included how training should be
structured and delivered. They advised that training be provided to all
employees, presented live if possible, be interactive, and held regularly but
in a varied manner.218 Training should be developed around scenarios
relevant to the particular workplace to clarify acceptable and prohibited
conduct, help employees comprehend their rights and responsibilities, and
highlight the formal process for complaints and investigations.219 The
instruction should also communicate support for the training effort by top
management.220
Additionally, the report advised trainers to move beyond conventional
compliance training and explore incorporating civility (anti-bullying)

213. A recent study found that victims of supervisor harassment are much more likely to suffer
retaliation than victims of coworker harassment. Blair Druhan Bullock, Uncovering Harassment
Retaliation, 72 ALA. L. REV. 671, 713 (2021). The study author argued that this finding provides additional
evidence “that courts must move away from treating [the] failure [of victims] to report as determinative
of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.” Id. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending
Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 110 (2018) (discussing the legal
hurdles for retaliation claims and the connection between harassment and retaliation); Deborah L. Brake,
Coworker Harassment in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2019) (focusing on retaliation as a key
site of inquiry in exploring the transformative potential of #MeToo).
214. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
215. EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 107, at C. para. 3.
216. Id. at C. para. 12.
217. Christina Folz, No Evidence that Training Prevents Harassment, Finds EEOC Task Force,
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (June 19, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hrnews/pages/eeoc-harassment-task-force.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y29F-YR7K].
218. EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107, at C. para. 31.
219. Id. at C. para. 21.
220. Id. at C. para. 29.
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training and bystander intervention instruction.221 The former would be used
to promote respectful workplaces, and the latter for helping supervisors and
coworkers provide assistance when they witness harassment.222 In explaining
these recommendations at a public forum, Commissioner Feldblum noted,
“[W]e need different types of training. Employers must move beyond what
we call in the report, ‘compliance training,’ training designed to teach
employees what is unacceptable conduct [in the workplace] and how to report
it.”223 At the same public event, Commissioner Lipnic summarized the
research findings concerning training in stark terms:
[I]t became clear to us that too much of what we’ve been doing in the last 30
years hasn’t worked. The fact is empirically evident in the academic literature
and was echoed by witnesses and Task Force members who have devoted
their careers to working on these issues. Training may be helpful in satisfying
an employer’s legal compliance or making out an affirmative defense to
liability. But as a standalone to prevent and reduce harassment in the
workplace, it has not proven to be effective. In simplest terms, training must
change.224

The co-chairs’ candor in discussing their findings on training is laudable
and the enormity of their conclusions should not be overlooked. Harassment
training, as noted above, is omnipresent.225 Training also serves a public
relations or signaling purpose; educational programs communicate to the
world that an organization has zero tolerance for harassment,226 especially but
not only when serious harassment allegations are made against an
employer.227

221.

Id. at D.
Id.
223. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Rebooting Harassment Prevention Transcript (June 20,
2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/24095/transcript [https://perma.cc/6UBK-H9TV] (comments of
EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum).
224. Id. (comments of EEOC Commissioner Victoria Lipnic).
225. As noted above, training was embraced by most large employers long before it was
recommended by the EEOC. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. Additionally, six states require
at least some private employers to provide harassment training: California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Illinois, Maine, and New York. See Project WHEN, Harassment Training Requirements by State: An
Updated List of State-Specific Harassment Training Requirements, https://projectwhen.org/harassmenttraining-requirements-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/LLH3-7VCC] (last accessed Aug. 2, 2021). Others
states strongly recommend harassment training. Id.
226. See Margaret S. Stockdale, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Maureen O’Connor & Barbara A. Gutek,
Coming to Terms with Zero Tolerance Sexual Harassment Policies, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCH. PRAC. 65, 69
(2004) (noting that zero tolerance policies run the risk of backlash, emphasize a form-over-substance
approach to gender equity, and obfuscate the ways in which respectful organizational climates can be
promoted).
227. I thank my colleague Jessica Fink for making this point after reading an earlier draft of this
Article. See also Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?, 10
ANTHROPOLOGY NOW 48, 49 (2018) (making the same point about diversity training as “the go-to solution
for corporate executives and university administrators facing public relations crises, campus intolerance
and slow progress on diversifying the executive and faculty ranks”).
222.
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Additionally, training can be persuasive evidence in litigation. One
researcher found that harassment training is commonly cited in two
contexts.228 First, employers reference training in hostile environment cases
as evidence relevant to both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense.229 In other words, employers point to training to show they acted
reasonably to prevent and correct harassment; and defendants also note that
the victim unreasonably failed to avail themselves of corrective
opportunities, which the victim knew about due to training.230 Second,
training is cited in cases where punitive damages are at issue both by
employers hoping to place themselves within Kolstad’s good faith safe
harbor and employees, arguing that failure to train makes punitive damages
appropriate.231
Those findings suggest an important question. With such damning
conclusions about training efficacy, should training be used as evidence in
litigation? In 2001, and again in 2018, I argued that a practice of speculative
value, such as harassment training, should not be relevant to employer
liability for compensatory damages.232 As will be explained below, I no
longer believe training or prevention efforts should be relevant evidence
where punitive damages are concerned either.233
For its part, after the 2016 report, the EEOC has continued to encourage
innovation in harassment prevention policies and programming. In 2017, it
released a guidance document, Promising Practices for Preventing
Harassment,234 and launched two new training programs for supervisors and
employees, which incorporate civility and bystander training.235 Following a
tumultuous period when the #MeToo movement was much in the news, the
EEOC in June 2018 held a hearing on Transforming #MeToo into
Harassment Free Workplaces.236 Testimony covered issues ripe for legal
228. See JoAnna Suriani, ‘Reasonable Care to Prevent and Correct’: Examining the Role of Training
in Workplace Harassment Law, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 823–28 (2018).
229. Id. at 824–27.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 827–28.
232. See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 44–45; Bisom-Rapp, Sexual
Harassment Training Must Change, supra note 202, at 68.
233. In those earlier articles, I argued that careful scrutiny of harassment training efficacy was
appropriate to evaluate employer good faith where punitive damages are sought. Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce
of Prevention, supra note 36, at 44–47; Bisom-Rapp, Sexual Harassment Training Must Change, supra
note 202, at 68.
234. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Promising Practices for Preventing Harassment
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/promising-practices-preventing-harassment
[https://perma.cc/G2AQ-8FZG].
235. See Kathy Gurchiek, New EEOC Training Helps Employers Create Respectful Workplaces,
Society for Human Resource Management (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hrtopics/behavioral-competencies/global-and-cultural-effectiveness/pages/new-eeoc-training-focuses-onfostering-respectful-workplaces.aspx [https://perma.cc/5X3U-FUEE].
236. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Select Task Force on
Harassment Hears from Experts on How to Prevent Workplace Harassment (June 11, 2018)
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reform and “innovative strategies that employers, unions, and others” are
using to vanquish harassment.237 Nonetheless, these efforts, while
encouraging, do not sufficiently catalyze change in either harassment
prevention or DEI programming. Given judicial deference to symbolic
structures,238 a reluctance of judges to second-guess employers,239 and
employer-friendly liability standards,240 employers lack incentives to
innovate and examine the effects of their programming and policies.241
A true shift by the EEOC from promoting managerial solutions to an
evidence-based approach to compliance would be an enormously
consequential step towards promoting substantive bias elimination. Several
other adjustments are necessary to end an era of cosmetic compliance. One
is to change liability standards so that employers are no longer shielded from
liability merely by adopting symbolic structures. A modification of liability
standards, however, must provide space for innovative employers to
experiment. Such experimentation could be incentivized through a
supervised research safe harbor. Those topics will be addressed before the
Article concludes.
Additionally, new research into harassment prevention and DEI program
efficacy must be conducted in actual workplaces. The EEOC has suggested
the kind of empirical study that is necessary but rarely undertaken. New
efforts would be augmented by what already is known from recent social
science research on the types of harassment prevention and DEI programs
that are likely to succeed and those that are not. Those subjects will be taken
up next in Parts II.B and II.C.

https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-select-task-force-harassment-hears-experts-how-preventworkplace-harassment [https://perma.cc/6S52-E9GJ].
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 156–163 and accompanying text.
241. Elizabeth Tippett’s study of over thirty-five years of harassment training concluded that
instructional content “solidified into a genre sometime in the mid-1990s.” Elizabeth C. Tippett,
Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 486 (2018). That genre
consists of an authoritative narrator, who summarizes the law, gives examples of proscribed behavior, and
provides advice. Id. Examples overwhelmingly emphasize sexual conduct rather than harassment on other
bases, such as race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or age. They also
present relatively minor examples of supposedly forbidden conduct such as “jokes, teasing, and comments
about an employee’s appearance.” Id. Tippett noted that the training implies that complex legal rules
prohibit a broad range of conduct. Id. Such an implication about liability is wrong. The rules are not
complex and much abhorrent conduct is not actionable. In fact, Sandra Sperino and Suja Thomas have
observed that courts analyzing the “severe or pervasive” element of the plaintiff’s case in hostile
environment harassment cases frequently find shocking behavior not serious enough to constitute
harassment, including brushing up against the victim’s breasts or buttocks, trying to kiss the victim on
several occasions, and repeatedly asking the victim on a date. SANDRA SPERINO & SUJA THOMAS,
UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 33–40 (2017).
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The EEOC’s Plea for Employer Cooperation into Research Efforts

The EEOC’s 2016 task force report repeatedly explained that we need
better empirical research on harassment prevention and DEI efforts. This is
an important acknowledgement, which might be used to pivot towards
evidence-based EEO compliance. The co-chairs identified harassment
reporting system efficacy as a matter ripe for real world investigation.242 They
also singled out harassment training effectiveness.243 As the co-chairs
explained, most research on training efficacy is researcher-designed rather
than employer-designed, and is tested on university students rather than
employees.244 This is because employers are generally reluctant to work with
researchers for fear of adverse findings, liability risks, and harm to their
public image.245 Indeed, employers generally “resist performing [their own]
internal studies to assess the effects of their antidiscrimination policies . . .
for fear of creating evidence that will be used against them.” 246
Interestingly, the co-chairs suggested that EEOC tools for resolving
charges and lawsuits be marshalled to advance empirical case studies. 247
More specifically, the report recommended the EEOC build into “its
settlement agreements, conciliation agreements, and consent decrees,”248
agreement by employers that researchers will be permitted to evaluate all
“policies, reporting systems, investigative procedures, and corrective
actions” implemented as remedial measures. Such a recommendation starkly
contrasts with the managerialist approach Schlanger and Kim identified in
the EEOC’s remedial efforts from 1997–2006.249
The report also suggested that research be undertaken in settings outside
of the EEOC’s remedial efforts. The co-chairs encouraged groups of
employers to collaborate with researchers across firms to allow data on
242. EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107, at III.B para. 22 (“[We need better research on
what type of reporting systems are effective. Many witnesses told us it would be extraordinarily valuable
for employers to allow researchers into their workplaces to conduct empirical studies . . . .”).
243. Id. at III.C para. 18 (“Indeed, our most important conclusion is that we need better empirical
evidence on what types of training are effective and what components, beyond training, are needed to
make the training itself most effective . . . . [I]t would be extraordinarily valuable for employers to allow
researchers into their workplace to conduct empirical studies to determine what makes training
effective.”).
244. Id. at III.C paras. 4-7.
245. Id. at III.B para. 22 (“[W]e are cognizant of the concerns employers may have in welcoming
researchers into their domains. For example, we recognize that employers will want to have control over
how data derived from its workplace will be used, and equally important, not used.”); see also Brandon
L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47 (2020) [hereinafter
Garrett & Mitchell, Testing Compliance] (“[W]hat makes the compliance effort deeply uncertain and
problematic is that the information generated . . . is simultaneously useful and dangerous. . . .
[D]ocumenting problematic behaviors creates a record that may be used against the corporation in future
administrative, criminal or civil proceedings, or may become the subject of a media exposé.”).
246. Garrett & Mitchell, Testing Compliance, supra note 245, at 68.
247. EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107, at III.B para. 23.
248. Id.
249. See Schlanger & Kim, supra note 78, at 1526.
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harassment procedures and policy efficacy to be aggregated and analyzed
anonymously.250 A similar recommendation was made regarding training
efficacy.251 Additionally, along with their recommendation that employers
embrace workplace civility (anti-bullying) and bystander intervention
training, the co-chairs advised that these educational programs be evaluated
by researchers.252
Beyond working with researchers, the co-chairs recommended that
employers self-assess their organizational climate and programming in
several ways. First, they suggested that employers evaluate their
organizations to identify, and then ameliorate potential risk factors that make
harassment more likely.253 These risk factors include: homogenous
workforces; the non-conformance of some employees to general workplace
norms; diverse cultural or linguistic characteristics among workers; periods
when outside social interaction has coarsened or become polarized; the
presence of young employees; the existence of rainmakers or high value
employees; large power differentials among and between groups of
employees; excessive reliance on customer satisfaction; monotonous work
tasks; workplaces that are isolated; work cultures that allow alcohol use; and
worksites that are decentralized.254 Second, the co-chairs suggested that
employers regularly “test” their harassment reporting system to assess its
utility,255 and routinely evaluate harassment training so programs can be
modified when necessary.256
Finally, the EEOC report made clear that the agency would like greater
empirical evidence on harassment prevalence, not only based on sex—which
includes pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity—but also on
other bases, including race, national origin/ethnicity, religion, age, disability,
and genetic information.257 The co-chairs recommended that the EEOC
collaborate with either private or government entities to create a national poll
on the subject; they recommended researchers examine harassment
prevalence on their own; they suggested the Merit Systems Protection Board
launch a new study based on federal workers; and they stated that the EEOC

250.

EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107, at III.B para. 23.
Id. at III.C para. 31.
252. Id. at III.D para. 24.
253. Id. at IV para. 6.
254. Id. at II.E paras. 5-16.
255. Id. at III.B para. 22.
256. Id. at III.C para. 30.
257. Id. at IV para. 5. Research on intersectional forms of harassment must also be undertaken. See
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128
YALE L.J. FORUM 105 (2018) (arguing that the #MeToo movement failed to account for “the contributions
and experiences of women of color” and that harassment doctrine must incorporate standards geared
toward “intersectional and multidimensional identities.”).
251.
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should add queries on harassment to the Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey.258
The EEOC’s signaling, via the task force report, that American society
must embrace harassment prevention and DEI efforts that are effective
coincides with recent social science research on the effects of common
symbolic structures. This research has shown that some DEI efforts work,
some have no impact, and that others create backlash effects. The next
Section will briefly review some of these findings. This research sets the
stage for moving beyond cosmetic compliance.
C.

New Research on DEI and Harassment Prevention Practices

Those committed to creating healthy and inclusive work environments
can draw from two important forms of social scientific knowledge about DEI
and harassment prevention programs. First, numerous studies have
illuminated the empirical reality of such programming. Specifically, the
studies have revealed data about which efforts produce changes in the
representation of minority men, women of color, and White women in
organizations; which structures have no effect; and which initiate backlash.259
Second, social scientists have theorized about why these empirical effects are
produced. Understanding the “why” of program efficacy assists in the
interpretation of results and may guide future efforts in organizations. Both
types of knowledge —the empirical and the theoretical—may be useful in
dislodging the long-standing corporate myths that drive a symbolic approach
to EEO and the jurisprudence of education and prevention. In an ideal world,
government regulators and judges would refuse to assign legal significance
to EEO policies, procedures, and programs, which social scientists have
found do not work. And advocates of organizational change would want to
reform or jettison programming that is ineffective at best and harmful at
worst.
1. Empirical and Theoretical Insights About DEI Programming
In their recent work, sociologists Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev
considered the body of empirical and theoretical research on DEI
programming in three instructive areas: (1) efforts aimed at preventing
managerial bias, (2) efforts promoting managerial engagement, and (3)
efforts demanding managerial accountability.260 Examining their own
258.

EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 107, at IV para. 5.
Social scientists examine the representation of these groups (minority men, women of color,
white women) over time because the purpose of DEI efforts is to increase workforce diversity and catalyze
integration. Note that this list is underinclusive. Most of the research on DEI and harassment prevention
programming focuses on these groups rather than on those who are sexual minorities, members of the
disabled community, and older workers. As noted above, the EEOC has recommended study, at least
regarding harassment, on less traditionally examined groups. See supra Part II.B.
260. See Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 815–17.
259.
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empirical work and that of many other social scientists, they find
programming in the first category unhelpful, while efforts in the latter
categories produce significant diversity gains.261
Dobbin and Kalev reviewed psychological and sociological studies of
DEI efforts aimed at preventing managerial bias, finding them to be
ineffective.262 These common programs include diversity training, diversity
performance evaluations (which provide feedback to managers on their
efforts to promote diversity), bureaucratic hiring and evaluation programs
(tests, performance reviews, merit scoring systems), and EEO grievance
procedures.263 Diversity training and diversity performance evaluations aim
to instruct people about their implicit and explicit biases, and provide
techniques for suppressing bias. The hope is that if decision-makers can
control bias, discrimination will be reduced.264 Bureaucratic hiring and
evaluation efforts are supposed to reduce biased errors in attribution through
performance data collection and standard setting.265 Grievance procedures
seek to resolve complaints about and rehabilitate managers who engage in
discrimination.266
Despite their ubiquity, Dobbin and Kalev argued that corporate
educational efforts to quash bias are generally not successful. One review of
985 studies of anti-bias interventions found scant support that training
decreases bias.267 Other studies have found that diversity training triggers
rather than eliminates bias.268 Typical diversity training efforts are relatively
short, and even the best programs produce effects that do not last.269
Moreover, several studies have found that diversity training produces no
effect on “women’s or minorities’ careers or on managerial diversity.”270
Indeed, Dobbin and Kalev’s longitudinal study of 708 firms found that
diversity training and diversity performance evaluations produced declines
in the representation of Black women and Black men in management.271

261.

Id. at 823.
Id. at 815–17.
263. Id. at 815–16.
264. Id. at 815.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 816.
267. Id. at 815 (citing Elizabeth L. Paluck & Donald Green, Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A
Review and Assessment of Research and Practice, ANN. REV. PSYCH. 60, 360 (2009)).
268. Id. (“Resistance has been documented in a number of studies. They suggest that anti-bias
training can activate rather than suppress bias.”).
269. See Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Companies Need to Think Bigger Than Diversity
Training, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 20, 2020, *3 [hereinafter Kalev & Dobbin, Companies Need to Think
Bigger] (“The research is consistent and clear. You can’t significantly affect bias in training that lasts an
hour, a day, or a week.”).
270. See Dobbin & Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?, supra note 227, at 49.
271. Kalev & Dobbin, Companies Need to Think Bigger, at *2 (“We analyzed data from hundreds of
employers, across dozens of years, to assess how different equity measures work. And what we’ve found
is that the typical diversity training program doesn’t just fail to promote diversity, it actually leads to
262.
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Bureaucratic hiring and evaluation efforts—also aimed at eliminating
managerial bias—are similarly unimpressive. Dobbin and Kalev noted that
managerial resistance can result in biased performance evaluation scoring,
subjective interpretation of scoring, or, for hiring tests, selective
administration of the exams.272 Not surprisingly, Dobbin and Kalev deemed
EEO grievance procedures ineffective not only due to the high incidence of
retaliation against complainants,273 but also because they found that
companies adopting such procedures “see significant declines in White
women managers, and all minority groups except Hispanic men.”274
Why do tools to constrain bias fail? Dobbin and Kalev pointed to the
social science literature on job autonomy and self-determination. As they
explained:
Everything we know from psychological and sociological studies of work
suggests that efforts to control managerial bias through rules and
rehabilitation will fail . . . . [S]uch control strategies typically backfire . . . .
Rules elicit rebellion . . . . [M]anagers appear to rebel against grievance
systems, which threaten their autonomy by opening them up to rebuke . . . .
Obligatory diversity training backfires because it signals that the company is
trying to control employees’ thoughts . . . . Companies that provided
feedback to managers on their diversity performance appear to elicit
resistance as well . . . . [M]anagerial resistance to mandatory job tests has
been shown to take several forms—managers can test only some applicants,
or ignore test results, for instance . . . . People resist obtrusive controls on
their behavior in order to maintain autonomy in decision-making.275

We must take great care in understanding these results. These findings
do not mean, for example, that EEO educational efforts will never work. In
fact, training can work if coupled with other diversity programs “that engage
rather than alienate managers.”276 Some of the most effective programming
will be described below. Nor do the results here indicate anything about
courses taught in higher education, or at the secondary or primary level,
examining the subject of race, ethnicity, gender, or other identity categories
in American society.277 Rather, the study outcomes indicate that corporate
EEO programming designed to prevent managerial bias, as implemented by
firms during the period studied, did not produce positive diversity outcomes.
In my view, the results underscore the wrongheadedness of judges and
declines in management diversity.”); Kalev & Dobbin, Best Practices or Best Guesses, supra note 73, at
604.
272. Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 815–16.
273. Id. at 816 (noting that in 2015, 45 percent of discrimination complaints to the EEOC included a
charge of retaliation).
274. Id. at 817.
275. Id. at 815–17.
276. Dobbin & Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?, supra note 227, at 52–53 (“The key
to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. . . . . The trick is to
couple diversity training with the right complementary measures.”).
277. See supra note 23.
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regulators who treat tools to prevent managerial bias as evidence that
discrimination was not present or that an employer should not be liable for
harassment or punitive damages.278 Similarly, these findings should
encourage organizations to assess the effects of their own programming and
make any changes necessary for improvement.
Unlike bias control programming, Dobbin and Kalev found that
managerial engagement is a useful tool for diversifying the workforce.
Programming in this category includes “mentoring programs, special college
recruitment programs . . . , and skill and management training with special
nomination procedures for underrepresented groups.”279 One key element of
such programming is its voluntary rather than mandatory nature. Managers
sign up if they are interested. As Dobbin and Kalev noted, the “programs
encourage managers to help address the problem rather than labeling them as
the cause of the problem.”280 In other words, these efforts are framed as
problem-solving efforts. Drawing from cognitive dissonance and selfperception theories, Dobbin and Kalev surmised that managers participating
in the programs come to see themselves as change-agents.281 This role fits
well with what managers do: they work on solutions to problems. Numerous
studies, including those by Dobbin and Kalev, have demonstrated that these
efforts increase diversity in the firms that adopt them.282
Finally, Dobbin and Kalev reviewed programs that promote social
accountability by holding managers answerable for their decisions produce
diversity returns.283 Examples of such efforts are diversity taskforces,
diversity managers, and federal oversight of federal contractors who are
answerable to the U.S. Department of Labor. Accountability theory from
psychology predicts that managers asked to explain their decisions will
suppress bias; the same is true of evaluation apprehension theory.284 Dobbin
and Kalev reported that “[s]tudies show positive effects of all three types of
accountability [structures] on workforce diversity.285
Ironically, the structures with the biggest impact on law and regulatory
practice are those that either do little or produce adverse effects on diversity.
Grievance procedures and training, for example, are not only deferred to by
judges; they are part of EEO doctrinal law.286 Moreover, those structures are

278.

See supra Section I.B.
Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 818.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 819 (“Our longitudinal studies of a national sample of firms, over the course of 30 years,
suggest these engagement activities typically promote diversity, even in the hard-to-change ranks of
management.”).
283. Id. at 820.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 821.
286. See supra Part I.B (describing the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to vicarious liability for
supervisor harassment and the Kolstad safe harbor from punitive damages in all discrimination cases).
279.
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far more common than those that engage managers or promote
accountability.287 The next Section reviews research on the impact of
harassment programming and comes to similar conclusions. Along with the
EEOC’s 2016 report, the body of social science research on diversity training
and harassment prevention sets the stage for a doctrinal course correction and
a shift to an evidence-based approach to EEO.

2. Empirical and Theoretical Insights About Harassment Prevention
Policies and Programming
As noted above, the 2016 EEOC report examined decades of social
science research on harassment grievance procedures and training. Grievance
procedures are rarely used, and when complainants do file grievances, they
frequently face retaliation.288 Additionally, social scientists have been unable
to demonstrate that harassment training reduces harassment; in fact, some
studies have found that training could make workplace conditions worse.289
Until recently, we did not know how harassment grievance procedures,
manager training, and employee training impact the gender composition of
management in firms. If the programming is effective, we might see not only
a diminishment of harassment, but also increases in the representation of
women of color and White women in management.290 A recent longitudinal
study published by Dobbin and Kalev provides a complicated picture.
Dobbin and Kalev examined a data set of 805 private sector firms covering
the years 1971–2002.291 Surveys were conducted to determine when
companies adopted anti-harassment policies and programs.292 That
information was compared against EEOC annual census data, which is
collected from private sector companies with more than one hundred
workers.293
Introducing grievance procedures was associated with declines of
“[B]lack women, Hispanic women, and Asian-American women” in the
managerial ranks.294 By contrast, adopting grievance procedures did not
affect the share of White women in management.295 Recall Dobbin and
287.

Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 824.
See supra Part II.A.
289. Id.
290. See Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Sexual Harassment Programs Backfire: And What
to do About it, HARV. BUS. REV., 45, 46 [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Harassment Programs Backfire].
291. See Dobbin & Kalev, Promise and Peril, supra note 61, at 12256.
292. Id. Dobbin and Kalev note that by 2002, 98 percent of the employers in the study had adopted
harassment grievance procedures, 82 percent conducted harassment training for managers, and 64 percent
had employee harassment training. Id.
293. Id. The EEOC census data is reported by occupational category and “provides the gender, race,
and ethnic composition for surveyed workplaces.” Id.
294. Id. at 12258.
295. Id.
288.
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Kalev’s explanation for why EEO grievance procedures fail more generally.
Grievance procedures are bias control policies, which threaten managers’
autonomy, open them up to rebuke, and trigger retaliation.296 Why was
managerial representation for women of color adversely affected while that
of White women was not? The researchers noted that minority women are
more likely to be harassed and file grievances,297 and perhaps White women
are better protected from retaliation by occupying more senior roles.298
Negative effects were moderated for women of color, however, in firms with
more women managers.299 Indeed, the negative effects disappeared at firms
with the most women managers.300
Interestingly, in contrast to non-managerial employee training, which is
described below, harassment training programs for mangers are associated
with an increase in managerial representation of women of color and White
women.301 The researchers believe this is because the training engages
managers in problem-solving. Managers are taught how to spot harassment
“and what to do when they see it.”302 Male managers are placed in heroic
roles as the parties who will stop harassment rather than be labeled as
potential perpetrators. Troublingly, Dobbin and Kalev found that the positive
effects of managerial training disappear for White women in firms where
women’s managerial representation exceeds 12 percent.303 In other words,
regarding White women, “when women’s gains in management threaten
men’s dominance, group threat can lead men to resist efforts to accommodate
women.”304 This effect was not present for minority women.305
Finally, the study determined that non-managerial employee harassment
training programs are correlated with significant declines of White women in
management.306 These programs, which are often framed in terms of
forbidden behavior, appear to trigger backlash against White women.307
296.

Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 815–17.
Dobbin & Kalev, Harassment Programs Backfire, supra note 290, at 48.
298. Dobbin & Kalev, Training Programs and Reporting Systems Won’t End Sexual Harassment.
Promoting More Women Will, HARV. BUS. REV. (“[P]erhaps [white women] . . . are better protected from
retaliation because, on average, they are in more senior roles. But overall, women who file harassment
complaints end up more likely to leave their jobs either involuntarily or of their own accord––and others
may follow them when they see complaints badly handled, with the harassers still in their jobs.”).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See Dobbin & Kalev, Promise and Peril, supra note 61, at 12258. In the study, companies that
launched harassment training for managers “saw significant gains in the percentage of women in their
managerial ranks, with white women rising by more than 6%, African American and Asian American
women by 5%, and Latinas by 2%.” Dobbin & Kalev, Harassment Programs Backfire, supra note 290, at
47.
302. Dobbin & Kalev, Harassment Programs Backfire, supra note 290, at 47–48.
303. Dobbin & Kalev, Promise and Peril, supra note 61, at 12259.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 12258.
307. Id.
297.
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Dobbin and Kalev noted that this finding is consistent with studies finding
various adverse effects of traditional harassment training, including that it
increases the likelihood that men will “blame [harassment] victims and to
think that women . . . are making it up.”308 Indeed, the men who are most
likely to harass may “become more accepting of such behavior after
training.”309
In sum, the study results, and the social science findings from other
studies referenced above, show that the symbolic structures developed by
firms and endorsed by courts to vanquish discrimination do not deliver as
promised. Some, specifically grievance procedures and traditional employee
harassment training, negatively impact people in the groups one most hopes
might be helped. At the same time, current research points to the promise of
reform. Changing the law is necessary as is transforming the culture and
practices of organizations. Accomplishing the latter requires safe but
accountable space for earnest employers to experiment. How that might be
accomplished will be taken up next in Part III.
III. TOWARDS AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE
This Article has highlighted two significant problems plaguing EEO law
and organizational practice. The first is a doctrinal dilemma. More
specifically, EEO law incorporates, and judges defer to, symbolic structures
long recommended by compliance experts as liability shields and
discrimination antidotes. Legal endogeneity, where those subject to
regulation set the terms of legal compliance, is most evident in the
harassment and punitive damages doctrines. In those areas, grievance
procedures and EEO training are the symbolic structures of choice.310
Researchers also find judicial deference to other DEI policies and programs
in EEO case law more generally.311 No one could object to the status quo if
we had confidence that symbolic structures positively affect workplace
environments and reduce bias.312 It is clear, however, that at most common
policies and programming, fail in that regard.313
The second is an organizational problem. Employer DEI and harassment
prevention practices, including but not limited to grievance procedures and
training, are driven by unexamined corporate myths about how to create work
environments free from discrimination. Many of those myths, such as the

308.

Dobbin & Kalev, Harassment Programs Backfire, supra note 290, at 47.
Id.
310. See supra Part I.B.1.
311. See supra Part I.B.2.
312. See Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2677 (“If diversity structures were uniformly
effective, [that these programs and policies are to judges symbols of diversity] . . . would not be
problematic.”).
313. See supra Part II.C.
309.
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utility of diversity training, are not empirically valid.314 As Dobbin and Kalev
noted, employers frequently lack knowledge of program efficacy because
“they operate in a faith-based, evidence-free zone.”315 Employers rationally
hesitate to examine their EEO compliance efforts for fear of creating
evidence that might be used against the firm in litigation.316
A pandemic-related civil rights crisis317 and new social science research
on program efficacy318 underscore the urgency of a compliance course
correction. Creating diverse and inclusive work environments requires a
move from a cosmetic to an evidence-based approach. While simple
solutions will not solve this complex problem, an obvious place to begin is
to change the liability standards for harassment and punitive damages. After
all, it is in those areas where legal endogeneity is most evident. Limiting the
types of evidence that can be used by employers in cases involving
harassment and punitive damages is advisable as well.
Altering the legal incentives that reward a cosmetic approach, however,
is necessary but insufficient. Ultimately, an evidence-based approach to
compliance requires innovative employers to collaborate with researchers
and regulators. I recommend an evidentiary safe harbor as a supervised space
for organizational experimentation. And I recommend continued use of social
science evidence in litigation to defeat the myths that stymie a substantive
approach to EEO. Those topics—a change in liability and evidentiary
standards, a supervised research safe harbor for employers, and continued use
of Brandeis briefs in EEO litigation—will be discussed below.
A.

Changing Liability Standards and What Counts as Relevant Evidence

Two decades ago, Linda Hamilton Krieger described the affirmative
defense in Ellerth and Faragher as premised on defective descriptive
accounts of how organizations and people behave. 319 The first prong of the
affirmative defense, which requires employers to use care to prevent and
correct harassment, implies that “by promulgating policies against
harassment, establishing harassment complaint procedures, and conducting
anti-harassment trainings, employers will prevent harassment from
occurring, or at least greatly reduce its incidence.”320 The implicit assumption
of the second prong, which requires the employer to show lack of care by the
314.

Dobbin & Kalev, Evidence-Free Institutionalization, supra note 54, at 809.
Id. at 823.
316. Garrett & Mitchell, Testing Compliance, supra note 245, at 68.
317. See supra Introduction.
318. See supra Part II.C.
319. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment – Normative,
Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 198 (2001) [hereinafter Krieger, Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal
Interactions]. For a discussion of the Ellerth/Faragher defense and what I call the jurisprudence of
education and prevention, see supra Part I.B.
320. Krieger, Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions, supra note 319, at 174.
315.
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victim employee, is that “rational harassment victims necessarily utilize
available internal grievance procedures.”321 Research then, though formative,
pointed to the folly of both assumptions.
Krieger then posed a question: does the divergence between the Court’s
descriptive accounts and empirical reality matter?322 Yes, it does, she
answered. The disjunction was important because the Court was using legal
doctrine to deter discrimination by creating incentives aimed at the parties’
behavior.323 A project aimed at incentivizing conduct cannot succeed if the
descriptive accounts of behavior are faulty. Indeed, in the case of hostile
environment harassment, an affirmative defense based on flawed descriptive
accounts may, instead of reducing discrimination, “increase the rates of
unremedied discriminatory harms” and undercut the aims EEO law.324 Today
the divergence is even more glaring because the public understands that many
symbolic structures are ineffective at best.325 Incentivizing use of such
policies and programs through legal doctrine makes a mockery of EEO law.
Scholars have advocated employer strict liability for hostile
environment harassment, both before and after the creation of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.326 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter
recently argued for closing the “harassment loophole” that provides a liability
shield for firms adopting train-and-report systems of harassment prevention.

321.

Id.
Id. at 197.
323. Id. at 198.
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, Sexual Harassment Training Must Change, supra note 232, at 73–74
(“[C]ountless articles in the popular press question harassment training efficacy, with the common refrain
being that training does not work . . . . These changed and nuanced popular perspectives on harassment
training may signify a tipping point.”); see also L.V. Anderson, You Say You Want a Diverse Workforce:
Badly Designed Policies Can Make the Problem Worse, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://slate.com/business/2016/01/corporate-diversity-policies-can-harm-the-people-theyre-intended-tohelp.html [https://perma.cc/W5F2-WAW5]; Justin Wm. Moyer, Workplace Diversity Policies ‘Don’t
Help’ – and Make White Men Feel Threatened, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/05/workplace-diversity-policies-donthelp-women-minorities-and-make-white-men-feel-threatened/ [https://perma.cc/5V7W-7J7L]; Musa alGharbi, Research Shows Diversity Training is Typically Ineffective, REAL CLEAR SCI. (Dec. 5, 2020),
https://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2020/12/05/research_shows_diversity_training_is_typically_i
neffective_652014.html [https://perma.cc/3TNJ-JUAS].
326. See, e.g., Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under
Title VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 41, 52 (1992); Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under
Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1343–44 (2014); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 789 (1999); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 735–36 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by
Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 107–18 (1995); Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual
Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
44 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1991).
322.
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He recommended holding employers strictly accountable whether the
perpetrator is a supervisor or a coworker.327
I have taken a different tack. My focus has been on what should count
as admissible evidence in EEO suits, recognizing the tremendous evidentiary
advantage enjoyed by employers. For example, in 2001, and again in 2018, I
argued that harassment and diversity training should not be competent
evidence of employer due care or lack of bias in EEO suits for compensatory
damages.328 A process of speculative value should not be used to deny a
plaintiff make-whole relief.329 By contrast, I suggested courts carefully
evaluate training efficacy when considering employer good faith claims
related to the safe harbor from punitive damages.330 At the time, I believed
that such a searching review by courts was likely.
Similarly, in 1999, I analyzed the bulletproofing advice provided to
employers to render firms’ employment decisions immune from challenge. I
recommended plaintiffs’ attorneys be mindful of the panoply of litigation
prevention techniques that potentially render documentary and testimonial
evidence suspect.331 By focusing on how firms create evidence to justify
employment decision-making, I hoped that the plaintiffs’ bar might fashion
effective counternarratives for their clients.332 In retrospect, this
recommendation strikes me as timid since social science research has
revealed that bureaucratic evaluation programs, often used to bulletproof
firms’ decisions, are vulnerable to bias.333
Decades of increasing judicial deference to symbolic structures,334
judge’s reluctance to second guess firms’ decision-making,335 and employerfriendly liability standards more generally, counsel against timidity in ending
an era of cosmetic compliance. To that end, I agree with those commentators
advocating employer strict liability for hostile environment harassment,
327.

See generally Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 41, at 195–96.
See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 44 (“Until we know much more
about antidiscrimination training and its effects, the existence of sexual harassment or diversity programs
should not be considered a fact relevant to employer liability for compensatory damages in any
discrimination suit.”); Bisom-Rapp, Sexual Harassment Training Must Change, supra note 202, at 68
(“[T]raining should not assist an employer in its efforts to establish an affirmative defense to vicarious
liability for harassment.”).
329. Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 44–45; Bisom-Rapp, Sexual
Harassment Training Must Change, supra note 202, at 68.
330. Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 44–47; Bisom-Rapp, Sexual
Harassment Training Must Change, supra note 202, at 68.
331. Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 39, at 1040 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys
should approach client representation with a sound appreciation of how employers produce neutral
documentary and testimonial evidence . . . . I suggest they be mindful of the panoply of litigation
prevention techniques described herein.”).
332. Id. at 1041 (“These defensive strategies may in some cases prove useful fodder for fashioning a
plaintiff’s counternarrative.”).
333. See supra Part II.C.1.
334. See supra Part I.B.
335. See supra Part I.B.2.
328.

2022

THE ROLE OF LAW AND MYTH

287

whether that harassment is perpetrated by a supervisor or an employee.336
This might be accomplished in part by legislatively overruling the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense for supervisor harassment. Liability
standards for coworker harassment could also be set legislatively; in other
words, one might, by amending the EEO statutes, abolish the requirement
that plaintiffs prove the employer knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to stop it. I also believe Tristin Green is correct in
arguing that strict vicarious liability is warranted in cases of individual
discrimination. Given the role of organizational culture in providing fertile
soil for discrimination, it makes no sense for organizations’ complaint and
response systems to protect firms from liability. 337 Moving to a system of
strict liability will provide better incentives for employers to consider the
effects of their EEO policies and programs rather than allow them to hide
behind such policies.
One should also consider what counts as competent evidence in EEO
suits. I reiterate my earlier points that diversity and harassment training
should be irrelevant to employer liability for compensatory damages in EEO
cases.338 I would add to that list EEO grievance procedures since they do not
promote diversity and inclusion.339 Additionally, considering all we know
about most bias eradication training, I now believe Kolstad’s good faith safe
harbor from punitive damages must be abolished.340 That might be
accomplished by legislatively overruling Kolstad’s safe harbor. Legislative
action can define a symbolic structure as incompetent evidence or irrelevant
to a claim. For example, in California, legislation mandates that employers
with five or more employees provide biennial supervisory and nonsupervisory employee harassment training.341 Yet the state legislature made
clear that compliance with the training mandate will not insulate an employer
from harassment liability.342 Certainly this approach—prohibiting employers

336.

See supra notes 326–327 and accompanying text.
GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING, supra note 39, at 151.
338. See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 36, at 44; Bisom-Rapp, Sexual
Harassment Training Must Change, supra note 202, at 68.
339. See supra Part II.C.1.
340. Joseph Seiner would likely disagree with this proposal. He endorsed the Kolstad safe harbor and
noted that to satisfy the good faith requirement, employers must show they have an antidiscrimination
policy, which is maintained and enforced. A firm should also train its employees on preventing
discrimination. Finally, responding to employee complaints through an established procedure is required
to establish good faith. Joseph A. Seiner, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Employment
Discrimination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 473, 511–12 (2012). As demonstrated above, these symbolic
structures—an antidiscrimination policy, EEO training, and grievance procedures—are not substantively
effective in eradicating bias so I do not believe they should shield an employer from liability.
341. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1.
342. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(c) (“[A]n employer’s compliance with this section [mandating
harassment training] does not insulate the employer from liability for sexual harassment of any current or
former employee or applicant.”).
337.
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from proffering evidence of a symbolic structure to avoid liability in an EEO
suit—would be possible on the federal level.
Taking these steps would increase the incentive for employers to take an
evidence-based approach to EEO compliance. Employers could no longer
count on the benefits of cosmetic efforts. These changes, however, would not
be sufficient. For example, in California, there is no Ellerth/Faragher
defense for hostile environment harassment.343 Employers are held strictly
liable.344 No one would claim, however, that strict liability has eliminated
harassment in the state345 or caused a change in employers compliance
strategies.346 To change employers’ approach to compliance, and encourage
them to work with researchers and regulators, the next Section examines the
concept of a research safe harbor, which would promote employer
experimentation and evidence-based compliance with EEO law.
B.

Regulatory Encouragement and a Research Safe Harbor

Myth-busting is essential to bring an era of cosmetic EEO compliance
to a close. Social scientists and the public understand that many common
symbolic structures—stand-alone harassment and diversity training, and
EEO grievance procedures, in particular—do not work.347 Social scientists
also cast doubt on the use of other common so-called bias elimination tools,
including performance reviews and employment tests.348 We are starting to
understand the kinds of DEI and harassment prevention efforts that foster
healthy workplaces and apparently lead to greater inclusion of minority men,
women of color, and White women in the managerial ranks.349 Apart from

343. See Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a Model,
128 YALE L.J. F. 121, 129 (2018) (noting that California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)
does not allow for an Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense).
344. Id. (noting that under California law, employers are held strictly liable for supervisor hostile
environment harassment).
345. Id. at 132 (“Even with the expansive protections of [California’s] FEHA, sexual harassment
persists, and employees are still afraid to express their opposition to sexual harassment.”).
346. As noted above, harassment training is mandatory in California. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §
12950.1. Employers with five or more employees must provide two hours of sexual harassment training
to supervisors and one hour to nonsupervisory employees every two years. The training must include
prevention of abusive conduct, and information about gender identity, gender expression, and sexual
orientation. Id. The California legislature directed the Department of Fair Employment and Housing
(DFEH) to make available free training modules to the public. The training module for nonsupervisory
employees was posted in May 2020. See Dan Eaton, State Posts Free Sexual Harassment Training for
Non-supervisors,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE
(Jun.
8,
2020),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/story/2020-06-08/state-posts-free-sexual-harassmentprevention-training-for-non-supervisors [https://perma.cc/EQW5-2HCN]. I served as a pro bono
consultant to the DFEH in the preparation of the training. DFEH worked hard to avoid “forbidden
behavior” framing. Indeed, as one commentator noted: “Addressing effective bystander intervention, the
training encourages viewers to be the ally they’d like to have in the workplace.” Id.
347. See Part II.
348. See supra Part II.C.1.
349. See Part II.C.
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changing liability and evidentiary standards, how do we encourage corporate
leaders to change direction?
A recent meta-analysis of studies on countering misinformation offers
lessons that may assist. Debunking messages are more effective when
corrective information is provided.350 Changing minds requires coupling
disconfirming data with information “enabl[ing] recipients to update the
mental model justifying the misinformation.”351 Myth-busting efforts by the
EEOC and other EEO regulators must be aimed at corporate crusaders and
innovators—people like those who helped bring about a revolution in
personnel and human resources policy in the 1950s and 1960s.352 Not
satisfied with cosmetic DEI efforts, these are the leaders interested in
substantive change. Corporate decision-makers must understand why
common DEI and harassment prevention mechanisms fail, why other
structures work, and how change might be implemented and tracked in their
organizations. Of course, not every human resources professional is a
corporate crusader and innovator. Certainly, some such professionals are
content with the status quo. Yet for strategic reasons, I believe that Dobbin
and Kalev are correct to focus on those who earnestly desire change. If we
are to bring the end to an era of cosmetic compliance, we must identify and
focus on these potential change agents.
Regulators should encourage evidence-based EEO compliance. The
EEOC’s education and outreach efforts could be instrumental to that effort.353
Additionally, the EEOC should promote further research into DEI and
harassment prevention program efficacy. To that end, convening another
special task force with a focus on evidence-based DEI and harassment
prevention would be useful. Relatedly, the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP), which is responsible for oversight of
federal contractors’ affirmative action and DEI efforts, should recommend
an evidence-based approach through its compliance assistance program.354
350. See Man-pui Sally Chan, Christopher R. Jones, Kathleen Hall, Jamieson, and Dolores
Albarracín, Debunking: A Meta-Analysis of the Psychological Efficacy of Messages Countering
Misinformation, 28 PSYCH. SCI. 1531, 1543 (2017) (“[T]he debunking effect was weaker when the
debunking message simply labeled misinformation as incorrect rather than when it introduced corrective
information.”).
351. Id. (“[D]ebunking is more successful when it provides information that enables recipients to
update the mental model justifying the misinformation.”).
352. See supra Part I.A.
353. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2022 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION PART VII (May 28, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/fiscal-year-2022-congressional-budgetjustification#_Toc71812511 [https://perma.cc/BTU4-3FSK] (detailing no-fee based and fee-based EEOC
outreach efforts).
354. For an overview of the OFCCP, see generally Jane Farrell, The Promise of Executive Order
11246: “Equality as a Fact and Equality as a Result,” 13 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 3–10 (2020)
(discussing the OFCCP’s “legal authority, mandates, and enforcement procedures”). The OFCCP’s
enforcement procedures include: (1) providing compliance assistance to employers, (2) conducting
compliance evaluation and investigating complaints, (3) obtaining conciliation agreements, (4) reviewing
employer compliance reports, and (5) recommending enforcement actions. OFCCP’s Enforcement
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Evidence-based EEO compliance should be embraced by the U.S.
Department of Labor more generally.
1. A Supervised Research Safe Harbor for Employers
One hurdle to surmount is the concerns of in-house counsel and others
in management who assume an evidence-based DEI approach will expose
potential violations that otherwise would remain hidden.355 Why invest in a
new EEO compliance strategy that could perversely lead to increased
sanctions or disastrous public relations? Solving this compliance dilemma
requires a different approach to compliance: a system that protects those
employers willing to experiment with the assistance of researchers and
regulators.
A few scholars have proposed methods that would allow or require
employers to assess their EEO, harassment prevention, and diversity efforts
without fear of creating adverse evidence. Pam Jenoff has suggested use of
the self-critical analysis privilege. Companies asserting the privilege could
assess their diversity initiatives and then shield the results from discovery.356
While noting that most courts reject the privilege in the employment
context,357 Jenoff argued that its acceptance would further the Supreme
Court’s policy of discrimination prevention. The cases she cited for support
are Ellerth, Faragher, and Kolstad.358 Because this proposal is based on three
cases that exemplify legal endogeneity and judicial deference, I fear it would
reinforce cosmetic compliance. The privilege would shield evidence not only
of successful programming but also traditional, ineffective programming. 359
A self-critical research privilege risks exacerbating the evidentiary
imbalance, which already plagues employment discrimination plaintiffs.
A different proposal is proffered by Gregory Mitchell and Brandon
Garrett. Examining several corporate compliance issues, including those
involving EEO, they suggested that firms be required to validate their
compliance programs and report on those efforts to the federal government.360
Firms under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight would be
the first to be subject to the mandate.361 The government would not set
standards for the type of programming companies adopt, but firms would
Procedures,
U.S.
OFFICE
OF
FED.
CONTRACT
COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/about [https://perma.cc/FF2X-TBZE] (last visited March 1, 2022).
355. Garrett & Mitchell, Testing Compliance, supra note 245, at 72.
356. Pam Jenoff, The Case for Candor: Application of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege to
Corporate Diversity Initiatives, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 569 (2011).
357. Id. at 585–86.
358. Id. at 595–99.
359. Garrett & Mitchell, Testing Compliance, supra note 245, at 75 (noting that the proposal’s
opponents fear the privilege will lead companies “to conceal otherwise discoverable information about an
ineffective compliance program and shoddy efforts to investigate and prevent wrongdoing.”).
360. Id. at 77.
361. Id. at 78.
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need to reveal the validation methodology employed, and provide detail on
the data forming the basis of the report.362 Information reported would remain
confidential. Unlike EEO-1 forms,363 the government could not use the
compliance validation reports for its enforcement activities.364 No other party
possessing the information could use the reports in litigation either.365
A validation mandate with a litigation safe harbor is an interesting idea,
but the proposal appears agnostic about whether the validation is done inhouse, by employing a consultant, or by working with university researchers.
No government enforcement action could be undertaken pursuant to the
report, weakening employers’ incentives for system improvement.
Moreover, since the most common symbolic structures do not work, why
reward employers who continue to use them and shield their assessments
from the public? Dobbin and Kalev found programming promoting social
accountability conducive to diversity gains in the managerial ranks.366
Without public disclosure in some form and with no chance for an
enforcement action, the social accountability associated with the validation
mandate would be greatly diminished. 367
Finally, Richard Thompson Ford, in a study focusing on Silicon Valley,
proposed a safe harbor pilot program providing an EEO litigation shield to
any employer making verifiable diversity improvements.368 Ford would
provide no limitations on how diversity is pursued; in terms of programs and
policies, “anything goes.”369 Employers who meet agreed-upon targets370
would be able to make individual hiring, promotion, and retention decisions
however they like without fear of litigation.371 However, Ford also built sticks
into this proposal: companies that do not reach “agreed-upon targets face
heavy fines and public shaming.”372 My concern about Ford’s proposal,
which was pitched as a thought experiment, is its superficial approach to
diversity. All that would matter to regulators administering the pilot is the
362.

Id.
EEO-1
Data
Collection,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-data-collection [https://perma.cc/JPV3-7NQ7] (last visited Feb.
17, 2022).
364. Garrett & Mitchell, Testing Compliance, supra note 245, at 77–78.
365. Id.
366. See supra Part II.C.1.
367. As Linda Krieger noted, the watched variable improves. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Watched
Variable Improves: On Eliminating Sex Discrimination in Employment, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE 297, 321 (Fay J. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale & S. Ann Ropp eds., 2007). She advocated
mandated, extensive data collection related to gender, jobs, and pay. Reporting under her proposal would
be not only to regulatory agencies but also to the public. Id. at 312–13.
368. Richard Thompson Ford, Civil Rights 2.0: Encouraging Innovation to Tackle Silicon Valley’s
Diversity Deficit, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 155, 177 (2015).
369. Id. at 178.
370. Ford did not specify how or with whom the diversity targets would be set. I assume he
envisioned regulators and employers discussing and arriving at achievable targets.
371. Ford, supra note 368, at 177–78.
372. Id. at 178.
363.
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employer’s bottom line. As such, Ford risks, and acknowledged risking,
trampling upon existing legal rights and potentially violating Supreme Court
caselaw.373
There are two notable facts about all three proposals. First, all of the
proposals allow employers to choose and examine any policies and programs
they believe will advance EEO. This is an error considering what we know
about the myths surrounding symbolic structures. When the aim is to advance
DEI and harassment prevention, why perpetuate those myths and use of the
structures? Second, under none of the proposals is the quality of the
assessment or validation process ensured—in other words, there is no effort
to confirm that the assessment process is conducted objectively. This too is
problematic. Protection from suit or an enforcement action, or the shielding
of evidence from discovery, is a valuable inducement that should not be
offered by the government without ensuring the quality of the efficacy
studies.
To foster research into the most promising efforts, I recommend creating
a supervised research safe harbor program for innovative, DEI-committed
employers willing to partner with professional researchers and regulators.
What follows are my initial thoughts about such a program. Eligibility would
turn on two factors: (1) participating employers would agree that the
assessment would be conducted by professional researchers;374 and (2) the
focus of the assessments would be on EEO programming that promotes
managerial engagement and accountability. Symbolic structures aimed at
preventing bias, such as standalone, forbidden behavior harassment and
diversity training, or conventional EEO grievance procedures, would not be
eligible for examination. These structures would not be eligible because
social scientists have found that they are ineffective at eliminating
discrimination.
With these prerequisites satisfied, the government would receive but
would not use the research results against any employer taking part in the
program. To remain in the safe harbor program, employers would need to
demonstrate good faith efforts to respond to the assessments and improve
their harassment prevention and DEI programming over time. The EEOC
might publish findings as best practices and feature the results at conferences
or other educational events. Mechanisms for reporting to the public on the
safe harbor program’s outcomes would maintain the confidentiality of the
employer participants. Employers could waive confidentiality if they wished
to publicize positive results.

373.

Id.
Without specifying qualifying credentials, I assume the researchers will typically be associated
with a university or other institution of higher education. Since, as noted below, the research will be funded
through grants, the grant-making entity, whether governmental or philanthropic, would no doubt evaluate
the researchers’ credentials when evaluating study proposals.
374.
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There are several ways in which a safe harbor might be created. One
possible method would be for the EEOC to create a safe harbor rule as a
regulation after notice and comment.375 Samuel Estreicher has proposed this
method for creating temporally limited safe harbor rules to address
employers’ aversion to hiring older workers, people with obvious disabilities,
and those with serious criminal convictions.376 Although the issue has not
been litigated, the EEOC’s ability to create a research safe harbor through
regulation is likely limited. Any safe harbor created would probably only
affect the EEOC’s use of employers’ research reports in its own prosecutorial
capacity.377 Moreover, employee advocates would look askance at any effort
to shield employers from the reach of EEO law simply because those
employers worked with university-based researchers to examine their DEI
and harassment prevention policies.378
Safe harbors can also be created legislatively.379 Congress might create
a research safe harbor for the EEOC to administer. Given my proposal’s
novelty and uncertain effects, however, were Congress to act, I recommend
the safe harbor include a sunset provision with targets to meet before
legislators could reauthorize the evidentiary shield. In order to avoid the use
of a safe harbor as a cover for flagrant or systemic discrimination, I urge
caution in creating a safe harbor through legislation. Congress might grant
protection that is too broad in its sweep and too difficult to eliminate if it
results in adverse effects.
A more promising route might be to focus on the OFCCP and its
compliance review process. As noted above, the OFCCP oversees the
affirmative action and DEI efforts of federal contractors.380 To encourage
employers to empirically assess their EEO compliance programming, the
375. As Melissa Hart explained, the EEOC enforces Title VII, the ADEA, and Title I of the ADA.
“Each of these statutes contains slightly different language about the agency’s authority to fill in gaps left
by Congress . . . . [Under] Title VII, . . . the Commission [may issue] ‘suitable procedural regulations’ . . .
. By contrast, the ADEA . . . broadly authorizes the EEOC to ‘issue . . . regulations as it may consider
necessary and appropriate . . . . [Regarding the ADA], the EEOC [is] ‘required . . . to issue regulations to
carry out [the ADA’s employment provisions].’” Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme
Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1941 (2006). Note that under Title VII, the EEOC is
not required to use notice and comment procedures. Id. at n.22.
376. Samuel Estreicher, Achieving Antidiscrimination Objectives Through “Safe Harbor” Rules for
Cases of Chronic Hiring Aversion, 2 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 1, 8 (2017) [hereinafter Estreicher, Achieving
Antidiscrimination Objectives].
377. One would expect any effort by the EEOC to create a safe harbor through the regulatory process
to be challenged in court.
378. Thanks to Chai Feldblum for making this point.
379. Estreicher cites to the Texas administrative code as an example of a state creating a safe harbor
for whistleblowing nurses. Estreicher Achieving Antidiscrimination Objectives, supra note 376, at 9 n.23
(citing Tex. Admin. Code § 217.20 (15)). Interestingly, Estreicher notes that a judicially created safe
harbor preventing liability for supervisor hostile environment harassment was created by the Supreme
Court via the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Id. at 9. The supervised research safe harbor I propose
would not be created judicially. Nor, as clear from this Article, do I believe the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense should continue to exist as precedent.
380. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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OFCCP would receive copies of research study reports, but shelter those
reports from use in its compliance reviews. This would provide breathing
room for those employers serious about DEI and harassment prevention to
experiment with and improve their efforts. Such a non-enforcement policy
would differ from the Voluntary Enterprise-wide Review Program, which the
OFCCP announced during the Trump administration.381 That program seeks
to “exempt from compliance evaluations ‘high performing’ federal
contractors who meet certain criteria.”382 My suggestion would shelter the
study results without entirely exempting the employers from compliance
review. Additionally, the OFCCP would still investigate discrimination
complaints, engage in conciliation, and, where appropriate, recommend
enforcement actions against any participant in the safe harbor program.
OFCCP might also create a mechanism for federal contractors to share
research results in an anonymous fashion. To the extent that groups of
employers in similar industries are studied, data might be aggregated, and
studies could be published without revealing the identity of any employer.
Publishing the results so that the public remains informed would advance
social accountability and myth-busting. Managers working with researchers
would benefit from the engagement and problem-solving aspects of the
studies. Further elaboration of this proposal awaits future development.
Funding the research, however, will be briefly addressed below.
2. Funding the Safe Harbor Research
Quality research requires funding. To ensure their objectivity, the
researchers working within the safe harbor program could not accept
remuneration or anything of value from the employers being studied. Rather,
the research would be funded by government or philanthropic sources.
Tying the safe harbor to research grants would enable university-based
researchers to undertake high caliber field studies. The National Science
Foundation (NSF), a public grant issuing agency with a long-standing interest
in DEI studies, is a promising source of funds.383 For example, NSF’s
ADVANCE program, which began considering grant applications in 2001,384
issues grants to universities endeavoring to diversify their science and
engineering faculties.385 NSF has significant involvement with the
ADVANCE grantees, which in turn has enabled the agency to influence and
381.

See Farrell, supra note 354, at 21.
Id.
383. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) (exploring the impact of the NSF’s ADVANCE program
at the University of Michigan).
384. See Dobbin & Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from Corporate Diversity
Programs, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 279, 279 (2007) (“In 2001, ADVANCE . . . considered the first round
of applications for grants for institutional change.”).
385. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, What We Learn in Troubled Times: Deregulation and Safe Work in the
New Economy, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1197, 1231–34 (2009) (describing NSF’s ADVANCE program).
382.
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spread positive diversity outcomes in higher education.386 Another possibility
would be funding issued through the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), which is keenly interested in the effects of
harassment and discrimination on occupational safety and health.387 Among
philanthropic organizations, the Ford Foundation, which funds research
aimed at ending inequality and has a Future of Work(ers) program, might be
a fertile source for grants.388
In subsequent work, I hope to flesh out the details of my proposal. We
must engage the employers most likely to make the shift to evidence-based
EEO compliance and conquer the myths that disable our EEO laws. A
supervised employer research safe harbor, which protects the study results of
grant-funded researchers, would be one tool for accomplishing these
conjoined goals.
C. Employing the Brandeis Brief
The two solutions set forth above—one advocating doctrinal change
through legislative action and the other proposing a supervised research safe
harbor—represent the means for nudging courts and employers towards an
evidence-based approach to EEO compliance. Critics might deem the former
wishful thinking given Congress’s present composition. A supervised
research safe harbor, if implemented, might only be sought by and available
to a small number of employers; moreover, conducting research is timeconsuming so results might take years to reach the public. In the meanwhile,
I recommend an additional method for myth-busting: the use of Brandeis
briefs in EEO litigation.
As many lawyers know, the Brandeis brief is associated with Louis
Brandeis’s submission in Muller v. Oregon,389 a case where Oregon’s daily
maximum hours law for women laundry workers was successfully defended
from challenge.390 Brandeis’s Supreme Court brief relied on “over ninety
reports . . . to the effect that long hours of labor were dangerous for
women.”391 A similar strategy was employed decades later in another

386.

See Sturm, supra note 20, at 314–21.
See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Learning from Troubled Times: Pursuing Equality Outside an Antidiscrimination Law Frame by Rethinking the Promotion of Safe Work During the Bush Administration,
45 U.S. F. L. REV. 603, 618–19 (2011) (describing NIOSH funded research).
388. See
Future
of
Work(ers),
FORD
FOUNDATION,
https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/future-of-work-ers/
[https://perma.cc/56SD-U4EY].
389. Miller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
390. Id. at 423.
391. Danya C. Wright, The Logic and Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of
Privacy, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 412 (2004). Research for the original Brandeis brief was
conducted by Brandeis’s sister-in-law, Josephine Goldmark. See William D. Blake, “Don’t Confuse Me
with the Facts”: The Use and Misuse of Social Science on the United States Supreme Court, 79 MD. L.
REV. 216, 221–22 (2019).
387.
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landmark Supreme Court case, Brown v. Board of Education.392 That suit
successfully challenged as unconstitutional racial segregation in public
education.393 Brown’s much discussed Footnote eleven cited several
psychology studies examining the racial harms perpetuated by separate but
equal systems,394 evidencing the impact of the strategy on the Court.395
While the scientific research employed in both cases has been
challenged as substandard,396 social science can nonetheless beneficially
impact both law and public opinion. Michael Heise argued, for example, that
although Brown ultimately failed to integrate the nation’s public schools, the
case had an unanticipated benefit because it “transform[ed] . . . [legal]
doctrine by casting it empirically.”397 He credited Brown with advancing
“law’s increasingly multidisciplinary character.”398 The more the social
science on EEO symbolic structures is cited by lawyers, the more judges will
confront the disjunction between legal doctrine and reality.
Beverly Moran noted that “social science often contributes to how we
comprehend society”399 and impacts public opinion years ahead of any
particular litigation.400 She explained that shifting peoples’ beliefs is a longterm project and suggests work must be done not only in the courtroom but
“in the court of public opinion.”401 My suggestion that lawyers more
frequently submit Brandeis briefs challenging the myths about symbolic EEO
structures is designed for those dual purposes. The more attorneys that
become familiar with the neo-institutionalist research, the more at least
certain judges and members of the public will be receptive to it. 402 As argued
above, conditions are ripe for a favorable shift away from cosmetic EEO
compliance in doctrinal law and organizational practice.403 Plaintiffs’

392.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495.
394. Wright, supra note 391, at 416.
395. See Beverly I. Moran, Constructing Reality: Social Science and Race Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 243, 249 (2005) (calling Brown “one of the great decisions in terms of its use of social science”).
396. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 391, at 222 (“[T]he scientific information included in the Muller
brief would not be considered reliable by modern standards.”); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social
Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 20–21 (2002) (describing criticism of
the social science cited in Brown).
397. Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 279, 280 (2005).
398. Id.
399. Moran, supra note 395, at 244.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 252.
402. I do not deny there are troubling trends in the way our highest Court has responded to scientific
evidence. In his study of how the Supreme Court uses social science, William D. Blake found “Liberal
Justices are more likely to cite science than conservative Justices.” Blake, supra note 391, at 252. He also
determined that Justices on the left and the right “resort to scientific arguments to bolster their underlying
worldviews.” Id. Unfortunately, social science does not produce a moderating effect on the Justices.
Rather, it leads to ideological polarization. Id.
403. See supra Part II.
393.
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attorneys can help hurry along that shift, which is necessary if we are to
restore the potential of EEO law to change society for the better.
CONCLUSION
EEO law and many organizations’ EEO practices are increasingly
recognized as ineffectual or even harmful by social scientists, 404 those who
have served on the EEOC,405 legal scholars,406 managers,407 and the public.408
Given the original promise of antidiscrimination law, it is heartbreaking to
read top scholars in the field who have opined that “[b]usiness executives
know that purely symbolic diversity structures will serve as well as effective
structures in avoiding liability . . . . Judges, for their parts, operate largely in
a check-the-box fashion . . . .”409 Other pathbreaking researchers have noted
that “[c]ompanies have . . . found that they can stay out of legal trouble by
adopting cosmetic fixes, which is much easier than solving the problem of
harassment at its roots.”410 Many of us in the academic world have been
making similar arguments for decades.411 The research is clear. Law and
employment practices are not working. In the wake of a pandemic-related
civil rights crisis and a period of intense political attack on EEO, we must
change course.
This Article has argued that conditions are favorable for beginning a
shift from cosmetic to evidence-based compliance. In the wake of a COVID19 civil rights crisis, we should not waste this opportunity. If we do not take
steps to bring law and practice in line with empirical reality, we will never,
despite President Biden’s laudable efforts to assemble a diverse cabinet,
achieve workplaces that look like America. I am hopeful that we will choose
not to continue making the mistakes that have bedeviled us.412

404.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.A.
406. See supra Parts I.B & III.A.
407. See note 224 and accompanying text (quoting EEOC Commissioner Victoria Lipnic).
408. See note 325 and accompanying text.
409. Nakamura & Edelman, supra note 4, at 2679.
410. Dobbin & Kalev, Training Programs and Reporting Systems Won’t End Sexual Harassment.
Promoting More Women Will, supra note 298, at *2.
411. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 39; Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of
Prevention,supra note 36; THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL
SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (2005); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003); Krieger,
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions, supra note 319; Grossman, The Culture of
Compliance, supra note 77.
412. Krieger, Message in a Bottle, supra note 179, at 57. Krieger believes that she will not see justice
in her lifetime. Id. I am hopeful for a slightly shorter timeframe.
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